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There are ongoing debates on the topic of restructuring. More so in South Africa 
(especial(y in terms of welfare consequences that are likely to arise) when its 
government undertook the difficult task of restructuring State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs). There is however a general lack of information and data on the labour 
dynamics of restructuring SOEs to inform that debate. This paper tries to fill that gap 
by looking at (Labour Force Survey) LFS data as well as extensive data provided by 
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Realising that inefficiencies place a large strain on the fiscus and draws resources 
away from essential social programmes, the South African (SA) government has 
undertaken the difficult task of restructuring State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). This 
usually entails downsizing or privatisation in an attempt to reduce the size and 
improve the efficiency of the SOEs. 
There are four major sectors that the SOEs in SA operate within; energy (Eskom 
group), telecommunication (Telkom group), transport (Transnet group) and defence 
(Denel group) I . While restructuring has taken place (and continues to take place), 
there has been little or no data on anyone specific SOE in terms of how their 
employment structure has changed over time. It is also important to consider the 
impact that such restructuring may have on the welfare of individuals as well as the 
economy as a whole. We were given the golden opportunity of gaining access to raw 
data from various SOEs (and in particular Eskom) when the Department of Public 
Enterprises (OPE) commissioned a study on the employment impact of the 
restructuring program. The bulk of this research paper involves an in-depth analysis 
of the given data, which for the first time provides the reader with a more realistic idea 
of how restructuring has affected SOEs employment structures over time. 
There are vast amounts of research on privatisation, though less so downsizing - the 
bulk of which is written or co-authored by Martin Rama. While the purpose of this 
paper is not to delve into the issues and complexities regarding restructuring, it is 
useful to provide our readers with an overview of the topic as well as some 
international experience of restructuring. Hence we begin with a brief look at 
restructuring in Section 2 before moving onto examining SOEs in South Africa. 
One of the key issues of concern within the restructuring debate is of course the 
welfare consequences that are likely to arise at both the individual and household 
level, as a result of the internal reorganisation of these state resources. These welfare 
consequences are intermediated through the labour market. Simply put, it is 
employment losses amongst workers in these enterprises that may result in deleterious 
household poverty outcomes. To this extent therefore, the broader labour market 
within which these SOEs operate is a critical starting point. It is with this 'big 
picture' approach that the paper starts its analysis of SA SOEs. Using the September 
2000 Labour Force Survel, one looks at current employment and employment trends 
in South Africa and how it compares to that of SOEs in terms of race, gender, 
education, location, sector and occupation. 
A first crucial take and something to bear in mind when reading this paper is that SOE 
employment constitutes only 3% of total employment in the society, translating into 
about 340,000 workers. What this suggests is that purely on the basis of SOEs' minor 
contribution to total employment, their relative impact on aggregate unemployment 
levels will be insignificant. This does not minimise the importance of welfare 
I Appendix A provides a broad overview of the four SOEs. 
2 A brief summary of the survey along with a description of certain variables that were created is 











consequences to SOE restructuring, but they do suggest that both public and private 
sector restructuring, with their much larger contribution to total employment, are 
likely to yield more serious effects on aggregate unemployment levels in the society. 
In terms of employment demographics, SOEs are underrepresented by Africans and 
females the possible outcome of either/the combination of Apartheid labour policies 
that provided preferential access to employment opportunities for Whites and a more 
skills-biased demand for labour. 
The paper then goes on to look at wage trends, bills, wage differentials and whether a 
wage premia exists or not in SOEs. Wages also serve as an indication of the relative 
importance certain skills may have which may differ within the sectors. This section 
however uses cross-sectional data and involves using either graphical representation 
to expose trends or medians of wages to draw inferences. A more formalised 
methodology: the earnings function is used in Section 5 to confirm results found in 
both employment trends as well as wages findings. Cumulative distribution functions 
(c.d.fs) as well as the earnings function show that the average worker in the public 
sector and SOEs command a wage premium by simply working in these sectors. This 
is particularly true when applied to unskilled labour employed in SOEs. SOE workers 
recei ve approximately a 21 % wage premium compared to those in the private sector. 
Assuming that private sector wages may be used as a proxy for an efficiency wage, it 
may be said that SOEs are paying a higher than efficiency wage to their employees. If 
this is the case, then the factor cost reasoning for restructuring in the pursuit of higher 
efficiency levels, is a strong one. Wage differentials are also lower in these two 
sectors, i.e. the difference between high wage earners and low wage earners are not as 
large as those in the private sector. This simply says that SOEs and the public sector 
are better remunerators in South Africa. 
Having better understood how SOEs are structured, we turn to the labour market 
evidence of SOE restructuring in Section 6 which is divided into (1) a case study of 
Eskom and (2) other case studies. As mentioned previously, there is little or no data 
regarding anyone specific SOE in South Africa. The LFS, which is conducted bi-
annually by Statistics SA, does provide aggregate data, but at the time of writing the 
survey had only been conducted once (the pilot study notwithstanding). Even so, the 
finer dynamics of employment changes are often lost in aggregate data and there is 
still a need for more detailed time series data. Eskom was able to provide valuable 
and extensive raw data3 on their workforce - a rare opportunity and the reason why it 
commands so much attention in this paper. The remaining SOEs were also able to 
provide data although not to the extent that Eskom could. 
Focusing on Eskom as a prime example of an SOE, we find that though terminations 
were 20828 strong, the workforce decreased by only 8,482 over the period 1995 to 
3 The data provided by Eskom and is by far the most comprehensive data set that is available. The data 
was converted and analysis was made using a statistical software application Intercooled Stata 7.0. 
Though data was provided for 1994 to 200 I, there were inconsistencies in the 1994 data set and 
therefore this paper focuses on the period 1995 to 2001. The variables provided included gender, race, 
age. household size, marital status, qualifications, designations, union membership, termination dates 
and income. Another data set, which contains the details of all the terminations over the years, was 
also provided and is used extensively to find the characteristics of terminated Eskom employees. Also. 
by data manipulation, basic characteristics of entry-level employees were diseernible allowing us to 
make inferences about the nature of employment patterns within the electricity regulator. Also, please 











2001. This means that both hiring and firing took place, intrinsically involving the 
reorganisation of the firm. 
A combination of forces drives the reorganisation. They are (1) employment equity, 
(2) restructuring, and (3) normal business processes. 
A movement toward a more demographically representative workforce is clearly 
represented by the high rate of terminations amongst White employees (in particular 
highly skilled workers) and the substitution of these numbers by African employees. 
The same is true in terms of gender. This movement is clear and indicative of labour 
transformations toward a more equitable workforce in Eskom. Despite the fact that 
these White employment losses extend to the skilled category; there is still significant 
employment attrition amongst the unskilled African workforce. There seems to be a 
general shift toward skilled labour in Eskom and Africans are affected greatly as they 
formed the bulk of basic skilled labour to start with. Considering the wage premia 
existing in the public sector, this could possibly be the price employees are paying for 
receiving that wage premium. This employment equity transition is certainly not 
considered as restructuring in the context ofthis study. 
It is found that a maximum of 51 % of total terminations and minimum of 36% (i.e. 
between about 10,500 and 7,400 individuals) may be attributed to restructuring 
(remembering that a net of only 8,482 employees were lost over the seven years). A 
paper on restructuring is never complete without an analysis of terminations and the 
dynamics between SOEs and their trade unions. Applying the Hick's model4 to the 
relationship dynamics between unions and the benevolent state instead, it is shown 
that the benevolent state would offer either better wages or severance packages than 
employers in the private sector. Also the presence of the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU is also likely to generate superior compensation for not only 
their workers but for all workers in Eskom. The combination of a benevolent state 
and good trade union relations means that those retrenched are at an advantage 
compared to the same situation in the private sector. 
The large "retrenchment" category found under terminations is evidence that normal 
business processes contributed to reorganisation in Eskom. There is also movement 
toward skilled labour in Eskom, denoting a possible shift to more teclmologically 
advanced process. This is shown by the termination of a large number of basic skilled 
workers. 
It is clear that there is great difficulty in separating restructuring and business process 
changes for both encompasses each other. Given such changes in a firm, an employee 
is faced with two scenarios, either job loss or no job loss. It is easy to make the wrong 
assumption that this is the end of the story. On the contrary, after job loss, an 
employee is faced with four possible scenarios. First, the employee may be 
4 Hick's (1966) industrial dispute graph shows employer behaviour as mapped by the "employer's 
concession curve" and union behaviour by the "union resistance curve. The premise is that unions start 
off with relatively high demands and as time progresses would lower these demands if negotiations 
drag on since this would result in loss of income to their members (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2000). 
Conversely the employer begins by offering small wage increases and slowly raising their offers as the 
expected strike period rises causing profits to fall. This bargaining process continues until the two 











out sourced, i.e. the employee continues to work but on a contractual basis. Second, 
the employee may re-enter into the market but to another sector, i.e. worker mobility 
such as an Eskom engineer going to work as an engineer in the mining industry. 
Third, the worker may re-enter back into the same sector due to dynamic effects, e.g. 
the ex-Telkom worker going to work for Vodacom. Lastly, the employee may be 
faced with no employment. When this occurs, there should be a social net for these 
persons in terms of a social plan and skills development. 
Policy makers have had an ongoing struggle with the tough task of finding the most 
effective labour market policies that would create sustainable reduction in the 
unemployment in South Africa. Active expenditure involves employment services 
that include training, direct job creation in the public and private sector and support 
for unemployed who are interesting in starting up their own business. In terms of the 
restructuring of SOEs and the impact this has on employees, there have been and will 
still be retrenchments. As contributors of the Skills Development Levy, SOE 
employers are able to claim levy grants, the first of which comprises 15% of the levy 
paid. A second grant is also available to them should they reach the targets sets in 
their workplace skills plans (50% of levy). SOEs should use the claim to set up a 
social plan that suits their needs. This could include training employees and 
equipping them with skills that may be transferred to either other sectors or elsewhere 
in their existing sectors. For workers already unemployed by SOEs, there is the 
National Skills Fund which deals predominantly with the training of unemployed 
persons in the hope that they would become self-sufficient (e.g. set up their own 
businesses) or become more employable. However frequently argued that there is no 
acceptable basis for privileging certain workers or recently unemployed workers over 
and above millions of already unemployed workers (Dept. of Labour, 1996). 90% of 
the National Skills Fund has already been allocated, mostly for survivalist purposes. 
A "Queue Management" system will be put in place and preference given would 
depend on social accords. Taking this into consideration, it would be unlikely that an 
ex-SOE employee would qualify for a position in the front of the queue. 
Given this, it would seem that the onus would fall on SOES to provide a social plan to 
the ex-employees by setting up their own fund. however instead of having to finance 
this entirely on their own, it would make more sense for the social plan to take place 













In a world of finite resources, efficiency should be a common goal in that it produces 
a higher standard of living. Savas (2000, p.l 0) insightfully notes that just as "freedom 
and justice arc menaced by an overly powerful government, so is efficiency". While 
this paper is focused on South African issues and data, it is important to begin by 
giving our readers a basic understanding of what restructuring entails as well as 
international experiences of it. 
2.1 Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises 
State owned enterprises are simply those that are majority-owned by government.5 As 
mentioned earlier, overstaffing and inefficiency is a common characteristic of both 
government and SOEs, but why focus on SOEs? Perhaps the main difference 
between the public sector as a whole and SOEs is the decision making process. 
Public sector decisions are based on either votelbudget maximization or welfare 
maximization (Gregory & Borland, 1999). SOEs must in addition consider issues of 
efficiency and profit maximising, and that is mainly the reason why SOEs have been 
the focus of restructuring. 
F or the purpose of this paper restructuring incorporates both downsizing and 
privatisation; both are believed to increase efficiency and should be implemented 
when there are signs of: 
(1) inefficiency, overstaffing and low productivity, 
(2) poor quality of goods and services, 
(3) continuing losses and rising debts ofSOEs, 
(4) lack of managerial skills or sufficient managerial authority, 
(5) unresponsiveness to the public, 
(6) under maintenance of facilities and equipment, 
(7) insufficient funds for needed capital investments, 
(8) excessive vertical integration, 
(9) obsolete practices or products and little marketing 
capability, 
(10) multiple and conflicting goals, 
(11) misguided and irrelevant agency missions, 
(12) under-utilised and under performing assets, 
(13) illegal practices and 
(14) theft and corruption (Savas, 2000, p.lII). 
Do note that these can exist in privately owned enterprises too, but it's the high 
preponderance of all these 14 factors that is relevant to the SOEs. The symptoms 
above often reflect more systematic problems based on the fact that many government 
activities are monopolies, which have little incentive to use resources efficiently and 
suffer no penalties for poor performance (Savas, 2000, p.II2), for example private 
5 They may be categorized as enterprises wholly owned and operated by the state, enterprises partially 
owned by the state and partially by private sector investors sometimes called "parastatals", enterprises 
owned by government but operated by outside managers and public services owned and provided by 
governments, local or national including railways. telecommunication networks, national airlines, and 











finns that perfonn poorly are either taken over or go out of business, while 
government on the other hand get bigger budgets! 
Downsizing is often used to streamline the workforce, in the hope of reducing costs 
and expenses, increased profitability, productivity and customer satisfaction (US 
National Perfonnance Review, 1997). In other words downsizing is thought to 
increase efficiency. Needless to say, involuntary dismissals are often politically and 
socially unfeasible, and as a result, voluntary approaches to reducing public sector 
employment have been popular (UNDP, 1999). 
Privatisation on the other hand involves the change from governmental or public 
ownership or control to private enterprise. This is also done in an attempt to become 
more efficient and profitable; and it is possible while maintaining and even improving 
the level and quality of services (Savas, 2000). As overlapping functions and 
inefficient administration is a problem often experienced in government functions, 
downsizing usually follows. Downsizing may even happen prior to privatisation in 
order to make the enterprise more attractive to potential investors. In other words 
restructuring could entail downsizing, privatisation or a combination of the two. 
This matter of sequencing, i.e. downsize then privatise or vice versa is an interesting 
one and should be explored. Figure I below is a decision tree designed by Rama 
(1999). It is intended to assist policy makers in developing countries, multilateral 
organisations as well as donor countries in the decision-making process (Rama, 1999, 
p.8). Chong & Rama (200 I, p.8) makes an important observation that often the 
choice is not between downsizing or not downsizing, but rather between downsizing 
by the government or downsizing by the private sector. The answer to this question 
again involves efficiency considerations and public interest issues and should be 
carefully evaluated (Chong & Rama, 2001, p.8). If downsizing was not undertaken by 
the government prior to privatisation, the new owners would have to deal with labour 
redundancies. The amount, composition and compensation of the downsizing 
exercise would probably differ depending on who downsized. Also the price that 
potential buyers are willing to pay would vary according to how overstaffed the 
organisation was (Chong & Rama, 2001, p.8). 
When government downsizes, there are certain problems that arise. The World Bank 
(2003) identifies 3 main problems, namely (1) paying too much, (2) adverse selection 
and (3) the revolving door. Paying too much is a problem intrinsic to downsizing by 
the government because "buying out" the workers is a simple and convenient way to 
"defuse the opposition to public sector refonn" and usually there is an excessively 
high cost of separation simply because governments are able to shift part of the 
downsizing costs to the tax payer (Chong & Rama, 2001, p.ll). When multilateral 
organisations and donor countries are willing to lend substantial amounts of money 
for severance pay, adverse selection arises as this creates biases toward voluntary 
separation schemes (Chong & Rama, 2001). Another area where adverse selection 
could occur would be when severance pay packages creates an incentive for the most 
productive workers (as these are the people who are probably able to easily find 
another job) to leave while the least productive stay (Chong & Rama, 2001, p.ll). 
The "revolving door" syndrome, where separated workers are later re-hired arises 
from this adverse selection and suggests that downsizing operations lead to the 











taken into serious consideration when downsizing and are incorporated in a decision 
tree designed by Rama, in Figure 1. However one reason why downsizing may be 
justified prior to privatisation is the credibility of the reform process as the ability to 
overcome labour resistance is seen as a signal that the government is committed to 
privatisation (Rama, 2001, p.ll). This signal then reduces the uncertainty faced by 
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2.2 International Experience and Learning from International Experience. 
There is conflicting evidence as to whether restructuring has lived up to its 
expectations of increased efficiency and productivity. This section will take a look at 
international case studies that show both excellent and poor results of restructuring. 
As the processes of restructuring have already been put into place in South Africa's 
SOEs, the next section is one on how best to implement a restructuring programme. 
Before the effects of restructuring are examined, let's first make comparisons of 
public, private and mixed enterprises in competitive environments, i.e. let's compare 
ownership arrangements. A study by Boardman & Vining (as cited in Savas, 2000) 
on 500 largest manufacturing and mining finns was conducted on 419 private 
companies, 58 SOEs and 23 mixed enterprises. The findings show that (1) private 
finns are both more profitable (return on equity was 14% larger) and more efficient 
(the ratio of sales to assets was 27% larger) than SOEs or mixed enterprises (2) 
ownership does matter, not just competition and (3) that SOEs and mixed enterprises 
perfonned equally badly showing that not just private investment is important but 
private control (Boardman & Vining as cited in Savas, 2000, p.168). Savas (2000, 
p.168) concludes that the popular practice of selling minority shares in SOEs, is in 
fact not privatisation but merely raising capital and that it may not lead to much 
improvement. 
To understand the differences between successful and unsuccessful SOE refonn one 
requires an objective measure of success. The World Bank establishes three objective 
indicators, financial returns, SOE productivity and the savings-investment deficit6 
(World Bank 1995). Using these indicators The World Bank finds that Chile, Korea 
and Mexico achieved the best results, as they perfonned better than the other 
countries and were able to improve on perfonnance that was considered good already 
(The World Bank, 1996). Egypt, Ghana and the Philippines had mixed results while 
India, Senegal and Turkey had the poorest results; though there was limited data, 
partial indicators show that the Czech Republic, China and Poland show mixed to 
good results (The World Bank, 1996, pA). 
The refonn of China's State-Owned Enterprises is a good example of where 
restructuring succeeded with good planning. It is a complicated case particularly 
when they had to consider combining a socialist system with market economy, and 
the success of the restructuring is unprecedented7• Experiences of Algeria, Poland 
and Egypt a1l suggest that restructuring is good but only under certain conditions. In 
Algeria and Poland, the evidence suggests that in an economy with an underdeveloped 
financial system, the refonn should focus on corporatisation that involved government 
oversight and monitoring rather than on corporatisation involving greater autonomy 
for public enterprises -- at least in the early stages of refonn (Bhattacharya, 2000, 
p.18). Also these programs seem to recommend a financial plan that should "impose 
steadily tighter budget constraints on public enterprises, place strict limits on their 
access to bank credit and address directly the role that commercial banks should play 
in their restructuring" (Bhattacharya, 1000, p.18). The Egyptian case study also 
suggests that the improvement in the efficiency and financial perfonnance of SOEs 
6 For a detailed discussion of these measures look in "Bureaucrats in Business: the economics and 
politics of government ownership" by the World Bank, 1995). 











requires exposing them to the threat of foreign competItIOn through trade 
iiberalisation measures if the domestic market fails to provide significant competition 
(Bhattacharya, 2000, p.18). 
A 1982 Kenyan report stated "experience suggests that many of these commercial 
investments would be more productive, better managed and more profitable in the 
hand of private owners" (Shirley, 1994, p.12) summarises the findings that support the 
restructuring of SOEs. Studies in Sub-Saharan Africa show that earnings from public 
enterprises are low and many run losses (Grosh & Mukandala, 1994) 8. A 1985 World 
Bank report on transport sector SOEs in eighteen African countries estimated that 
only 20% of the public enterprises in the transport sector could generate revenue 
sufficient to cover operating costs, 20% covered operating costs plus depreciation, 
40% could scarcely cover operating costs, and 20% were far from being able to cover 
these costs (Institut de developpement economique as cited in Grosh & Mukandala, 
1994, p.13). However it is crucial that one remembers to exercise care in interpreting 
financial data in SOEs due to differences in accounting and tax systems that apply to 
them. 
Numerous other studies have been conducted to find the effectiveness of restructuring 
programs, particularly privatisation. The US National Performance Review (1997) 
reports of a 1993 survey of restructuring practices among 531 large companies which 
revealed that although more than half the companies achieved goals of reducing costs 
and expenses, less than half the companies achieved goals of increased productivity, 
productivity and customer satisfaction. Thus, whilst downsizing has been identified 
as a tool that can successfully eliminate excesses in staffing, bureaucracy and 
expenditures, it is one that must be used with other management tools. 
So, what explains the differences in the experiences of countries that render 
restructuring of SOEs a success or failure? The five components of reform that 
economic theorists and reform practitioners widely recommend are: divestiture, 
competition, hard budgets, financial sector reform, and changes in the institutional 
relationship between SOEs and governments (The World Bank, 1995, pA). The 
World Bank (1995, pA) found that the more successful reformers made the most of all 
five components, using them as synergetic components of an overall strategy versus 
using them as separate options. The key findings about the ways that successful 
reformers and less successful reformers approached each of these five components 
include the following: 
• Successful SOE reformers divested more, especially where the initial size of 
the state enterprise sector was large. 
• Successful SOE reformers introduced more competition. They liberalised 
trade, eased restrictions on entry, and unbundled large enterprises. 
• Successful SOE reformers hardened SOE budgets. They reduced or 
eliminated direct subsidies, put access to credit on a more commercial basis, 
improved regulation of SOE monopoly prices, and reduced or eliminated 
hidden subsidies. 












• Successful SOE refonners refonned the financial sector. They strengthened 
supervision and regulation, relaxed controls over interest rates and reduced 
directed credit. They also relaxed entry restrictions and privatised banks once 
SOE refonn and supervisory and regulatory refonn were well under way. 
• Surprisingly, successful and unsuccessful refonners alike tried to improve the 
incentive structure by changing the relationship between SOE managers and 
the government. Countries at the top and bottom of the perfonnance ratings 
introduced new oversight bodies, increased managerial autonomy, and signed 
explicit perfonnance agreements. 
(Source: World Bank, 1995, p.5) 
A brief look at restructuring reveals that the process of restructuring as a complex 
process with no guarantees. Welfare consequences that are likely to arise from 
restructuring are often at the top of debate list, more so in South Africa - a country 
riddled with unemployment problems. In the next section, this paper gives a picture 











3. A SNAPSHOT OF THE SOE LABOUR MARKET 
In order to derive a more naunced understanding of the specific labour market 
consequences that may arise out of SOE restructuring it is critical that we, in the first 
instance, provide an overview of the nature of the SOE labour market. Hence, this 
section will attempt to provide this snapshot, through the use of a nationally 
representative household survey dataset, the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is 
conducted twice a year (the first being a pilot run in February 2000) by Statistics 
South Africa and focuses primarily on labour market issues9. 
One of the key issues of concern within the restructuring debate is of course the 
welfare consequences that are likely to arise at both the individual and household 
level, as a result of the internal reorganisation of these state resources. These welfare 
consequences are intermediated through the labour market. Simply put, it is 
employment losses amongst workers in these enterprises that may result in deleterious 
household poverty outcomes. To this extent therefore, the broader labour market 
within which these SOEs operate is a critical starting point. According to the LFS of 
September 2000, there were 11.7 million individuals employed in either the formal or 
the informal sector. In addition, approximately 6.6 million workers were jobless, 
representing an unemployment rate of about 36% using the expanded definition. Two 
points are worth considering here. Firstly, the high unemployment figures result from 
new entrants in the labour market who cannot find employment typically school 
leavers. Here, any form of restructuring is not directly responsible for the 
unemployment amongst this cohort of workers. Secondly, for workers that have lost 
their jobs, the number of jobs that a sector has lost will be proportional to its 
contribution to total employment. The larger the sector in total employment, the 
bigger its contribution to total unemployment figures, should it decide to fire workers. 
The two points above are important in the context of Figure 2 below. The figure 
provides a breakdown of total employment in South Africa, by type of employer. 
Hence, it is evident that 57% of all workers are employed in the private sector. The 
second largest employer (discounting the 'not applicable' code) is the public sector, 
accounting for 14% of all employees in the labour market. 
9 A detailed overview of the data, definitions as well as explanations on how variables were created in 
























What is of interest here is of course the SOE representation. It is evident that SOE 
employment is only 3% of total employment in the society. To put this into 
perspective, public sector employment numbers 1.7 million, the private sector 
approximately 6.7 million, while aggregate employment in SOE s stands at about 
340,000 workers. In the context of the above discussion this is a crucial first take on 
the SOE labour market. What this suggests is that purely on the basis of SOEs' minor 
contribution to total employment, their relative impact on aggregate unemployment 
levels will be insignificant. This does not minimise the importance of welfare 
consequences to SOE restructuring, but they do suggest that both public and private 
sector restructuring, with their much larger contribution to total employment, are 
likely to yield more serious effects on aggregate unemployment levels in the society. 
This initial, very basic take on the data therefore suggests firstly, that SOE 
employment numbers are relatively small when compared wlth the public and private 
sector. In addition, this base employment level is suggestive of the fact that 
restructuring within SOEs, is statistically not likely to engender significant effects on 
national unemployment levels - while reiterating that this should not discount from 
the welfare losses that could still occur through such firm reorganisation. 
3.1 SOE Employment by Race & Gender 
Within this broad comparative snapshot of SOE employment, it is useful to try and 
understand the SOE labour market in more detail. An overview of the distribution of 
SOE employment by race and gender (and further below by occupation and 
education) are necessary as a backdrop for understanding the possible labour market 
10 Note that in the LFS Sept. 2000 the "Not applicable" variable contains those that are: (1) working on 
his/her own or on a small family farm/plot or collecting natural products from the forest of sea, (2) 
working on his/her own or with a partner, in any type of business (including commercial farms) and (3) 
helping without pay in a family business. One is comfortable categorising the first and last as part of 
the informal sector however the second seems to be better suited as forming part of the self-employed 
and thus part of the private sector. Though this is an interesting and important issue it should not affect 











consequences of the proposed restructuring programmes within the different SOEs. 
In an attempt to make the private sector more comparable with the public sector and 
SOEs, domestic workers and workers involved at the elementary agricultural, hunting 
and related services are excluded in the construction of the private sector dummy. 
Henceforth, we will refer to the employee as part of the private sector but note that it 
is essentially the non-agricultural and non-domestic private sector. 
Figure 3 below presents employment distribution, using the LFS 2000 again, by type 
of employer. For example, 68% of all employed in the society are African, compared 
with a White representation of 17%. We provide these distributions then for the 
private and public sector as well as SOEs. 
SOE R.Jblic Private Total Errployed 
• Africal 0 Coloured • Indian 0 White 
Figure 3: Racial Breakdown of SOEs, Public and Private Sector 
The national trends are closely mimicked in the private and public sector distributions. 
For example, African representation was 59% in the private sector and 67% in the 
public sector. Similarly White employment shares were fairly close to the national 
distribution. Statistically, of course this is also what we would expect, given the large 
weighting of these employers in the national employment levels. Conversely, though, 
SOE employment by race is counter to the national distribution. Hence, it is evident 
that within SOEs, there is an over-representation of Whites (31.6%) and an under-
representation of Africans (a low 54.3%) relative to the national distributions of 17% 
and 68% respectively. This uneven racial representation of SOE employment is a key 
labour market characteristic that differentiates it from both private and the public 
sector employers. 
One conjecture from this result is that it is perhaps an outcome of the Apartheid 
labour policies that provided preferential access to employment opportunities for 
Whites. Secondly, and related to the first and an issue we delve into detail below, is 
that the SOE labour demand needs are more skills-biased than its private and public 
sector counterparts. Given this, the preference for higher skilled workers, who would 
invariably be White, reflects in this maldistribution in employment by race. It is 











sector, the relative size of the SOEs makes the disparity less significant - a point 
made at the outset of this analysis. In other words, though Africans (Whites) only 
form 54.3% (31 .6%) of aggregate SOE employment, they constitute only 2.3% (5.5%) 
of the African (White) workforce as a whole. What would be interesting to determine 
however, and it is something we tum to in our analysis of specific cases of SOE 
restructuring, is the extent to which one of the unintended consequences of 
restructuring has been to positively alter this racial distribution of employment. 
Using the same approach as the above figure, we present below employment by 
gender according to the three employer types in the economy. Figure 4 tries to 
capture both the male/female composition of each employer type as well as the 
proportion of the entire working male/female population that these individuals fonn. 
For example, of the entire working population, 52% of females and 32% of males 
work in the private sector. The private sector in tum has a female/male composition 
of33% and 67% respectively. 
SOE F\Jblic Private Total Employed 
_ male C:::J female -+- % total male -...-% total female 
Figure 4: Gender Breakdown of SOEs, Public and Private Sectors 
Considering that the employed have a male/female breakdown of 55% and 45%, we 
find that both the public and private sector are fairly representative - a repetition of 
the race results above. SOE employment in absolute terms is small, represented by 
the share of males and females in total employment. In tenns of intra-SOE gender 
distributions, SOEs reveal a very skewed gender composition. Hence, while the 
public and private sector have a male representation of between 50 and 67%, the 
figure for SOEs is 73% - constituting almost three-quarters of their workforce. This 
could perhaps be explained by the more technical nature of SOE work, a traditionally 
male dominated field - an issue we explore later in the paper. Once again, it would 
also be interesting in the specific SOE cases that are taken up below, to detennine the 
extent to which a more representative gender distribution of employment was 











3.2 SOE Employment By Occupation 
In the previous section, we found an over-representation of males and Whites in the 
SOEs. We postulated that this was due to the more teclmical nature of work in SOEs 
that tended to be more male-dominated and the preference given to Whites as a result 
of Apartheid labour market practices and an a priori skills-bias in employment needs 
that implicitly meant a higher proportion of White workers. We extend this notion in 
this sub-section, by exploring employment distributions by occupation across the 
different employer types, and within the SOEs themselves 11. 
Table 1: Occupational Breakdown of SOEs, Public and Private Sectors 
Occupation SOEs Public Private All Employed 
Managers 6.0% 3.3% 4.7% 4.8% 
Professionals 7.7% 13.4% 3.8% 4.5% 
Technicians 14.5% 28.2% 8.1% 9.2% 
Clerks 24.5% 11.8% 13.7% 9.0% 
Service 8.6% 15.5% 13.9% 12.1% 
Crafts 13.6% 5.1% 19.5% 13.0% 
Operators 11.1% 4.8% 16.4% 9.8% 
Elementary 13.1% 15.6% 15.6% 28.5% 
The full ranking of the occupations covered in the graphs above, in terms of high to 
low skills levels, and according to the Standard Industrial Classification of 
Occupations are: 
• Professionals 
• Legislators, senior officials and managers 
• Teclmicians and associate professionals 
• Clerks 
• Service workers, shop and market sales workers 
• Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 
• Craft and related trades workers 
• Plant and machine operators and assemblers and 
• Elementary occupations 
Keeping this in mind, Table 1 paints an interesting picture. First we find that in terms 
of the professionals and managers (i.e. the two highest skilled categories), the SOEs 
have a much higher percentage of skilled labour in comparison with the private sector 
(13.7% as opposed to 8.5%). Interestingly, these shares of skilled employment .are 
both below the public sector, where professionals and managers account for close to 
17% of total public sector employment. If one incorporates both skilled and semi-
skilled workers, the share of these workers in total employment is 28%, while it is 
slightly higher in the private sector at 30%. In contrast in the public sector, semi-
skilled and skilled workers account for over 55% of all the sector's employment. For 
SOEs, this figure stands at 53%. As a consequence of this high skills quotient 
amongst SOEs and in the public sector, the share of unskilled iabour is well below the 
II For the sake of simplicity, during the construction of these figures "unspecified" observations as well 
as "Skilled agricultural and fishery workers" were omitted as they formed a negligent proportion of the 











national mean and the average for the private sector. Interestingly, the share of 
elementary workers in SOEs, is lower than that for the public sector. 
What the above suggests, in the first instance, is that SOE employment is skills-
intensive relative to the private sector, but no less so than the public sector. As a 
consequence, the share of unskilled employment within SOEs, is relatively small. 
This high skills requirement within SOEs thus does go some way to explaining the 
disproportionate share of Whites in SOE employment, and to some extent the high 
share of male employees. In order to more exhaustively verify the existence of a race-
occupation overlap, we examine, in Figure 5 below, the racial shares of employment 
by the major occupational divisions, within SOEs 12. The figures confirm that the 
skilled and semi-skilled groups i.e. the first 4 groups are predominantly White. 
Hence, of all professionals and managers employed by SOEs, approximately 60% are 
White and 30% African. 
Ele mentary 
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Figure 5: Racial Breakdown of Occupations in SOEs 
African representation does increase as we move into semi-skilled occupations. 
African representation for technical staff therefore stands at 40% compared with 47% 
for White employees. In addition, of the aggregate SOE employment of clerks, 42% 
are White and 36% African. Not surprisingly, the representations are reversed at the 
bottom-end of the labour market, as a large proportion of elementary workers, 
operators and craft workers are African. 
In one sense, the above figure mimics the national occupational trends, in that White 
representation increases at higher skill levels, relative to African representation. The 
SOE occupational labour market thus reflects the familiar racial division of labour of 
the broader South African labour market. There remains one crucial difference 
12 Note that percentage shares of less than 1.5% are not included in an attempt to make the figurer less 











though: given that the SOE is predominantly an employer of high skilled and semi-
skilled workers, with (it would seem) very specific human capital requirements, it 
means that its racial division of labour is even more skewed relative to the private 
sector and indeed the public sector. To this end, one would hope that the restructuring 
initiatives of the various SOEs are undertaken in a manner that, at a minimum, do not 
exacerbate this already unusually high representation of white employees. 
The gender division of the above occupations replicates the overall SOE gender 
distributions. The figure is presented in Appendix Cl, Figure 42 below. Across all 
the 9 major occupational divisions, with the exception of clerks, the data indicates that 
the number of males outweighs that of females. There would seem therefore to be an 
even distribution of the male-female ratios observed for all SOE employees, when 
examining the data by occupations. Once again, as with the race data, it would be 
interesting to determine whether there is, as an unintended consequence, a more 
equitable gender distribution in employment arising out of SOE restructuring. 
Table 1 above illustrates the very high share of clerical workers within SOEs. 
Specifically, the data shows that a quarter of SOE employees are clerical workers -
twice that of the public and private sector, as well as the national employed 
popUlation. This could be the result of two things. Firstly, it is possible that this high 
share of clerical staff reflects an excess quantum of administrators or "paper pushers" 
within SOEs - often a sign of a bloated workforce and a marker usually of 
inefficiency and low productivity levels. Secondly, it is also probable that the large 
clerical work force is due to the sector specificity of some of the SOEs. In other 
words, it is plausible that the nature of some of the SOEs require this sort of work 
force. The postal and telecommunications industry, represented by Telkom is a prime 
example here. In order to interrogate this issue further, we have attempted to provide 
a more detailed description of the type of clerical staff employed by SOEs. 
Figure 6 below provides this breakdown, and shows that there is a wide variation in 
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Figure 6: Oerical Breakdown of SOEs 
These sub-divisions include categories such as "mail clerks and sorting carriers", 
"telephone switchboard operators" and "cashiers and ticket sales" i3" The largest 
component of the "clerks" variable is "library and filing clerks" fonning 16.2%, a 
category that is not necessarily specific to the operations of SOEs. Following this, 
'accounting and book-keeping' and 'mail carriers & sorting clerks' are the 2nd and 3rd 
largest component of the clerical SOE workforce. The data in this fonn, makes it hard 
to find any strongly suggestive infonnation on the presence of inefficiency within the 
different SOEs. It is possible however, that the high share of filing clerks, together 
with those categorised as being in accounting and bookkeeping are key to 
interrogating more carefully, whether they represented inefficient work organisation 
within SOEs. 
13 The variable "Clerk" is broken down into office clerks and customer services clerks. In tum office 
clerks are divided into (1) secretaries and keyboard operating clerks, (2) numerical clerks, (3) material 
recording and transport clerks and (4) library, mail and related clerks. Customer service clerks are aiso 












4. WAGE BILLS, LEVELS & DIFFERENTIALS 
One of the key issues that would drive restructuring initiatives within SOEs would be 
the nature and level of factor costs within the individual enterprises. In our context 
here, this translates into the importance of considering the role of wage costs within 
the SOE sector, and as a starting point, to determine how these compare both in terms 
of levels and differentials, with the public and the private sector. This information 
would remain a critical backdrop in understanding the nature of wage commitments 
within enterprises that are embarking on a programme of restructuring. 
4.1 Wage Levels and Differentia)s 
Using the data from the September 2000 Labour Force Survey again, this section thus 
focuses on wages and wage differentials that may occur between the different 
employer types and continues by comparing the wage bills for production and non-
production workers in the three sectors. Analysing the wage bill allows one to see the 
relative importance (non)-production workers have in the various sectors. Interesting 
patterns can also be found by looking at the median 14 wages of different groups and 
cumulative distributions are useful in highlighting differences in income distributions 
between sectors. 
Table 2 below presents a snapshot of earnings in South Africa as a whole, as well as 
according to the three employer types. The racial wage wedge so common in South 
Africa is evident here, as across all employer types and for the economy as a whole, 
White workers at the median, earn more than their African, Coloured and Asian 
counterparts. Specifically, for the national sample, Africans earn at the median about 
one-fifth of the median White earner. 
Table 2: Median Wage by Employer Type and Race 
Sector African Coloured Asian White Total 
% of Public African as %1 
(Total) of White 
Public 2500 3056 4000 5000 3000 100% 50.0% 
OE 2000 2500 5000 5700 3000 100% 35.1% 
Private 1200 1517 2500 4133 1400 46.7% 29.0% 
National 980 1400 2600 4800 1300 43.3% 20.4% 
The employer type wages though are very interesting. They suggest that for African 
and Coloured workers, the highest return is to be found in the public sector, then 
SOEs and finally the private sector. For these workers therefore, the public sector is 
at the median, the most lucrative employer in the economy. However, for Asians and 
Whites, the ranking alters. While, the private sector still remunerates the lowest of the 
three, it is in fact SOEs that offer the highest return to these two cohorts. Put 
differently, Whites and Asians are better off being employed in SOEs than any other 
type of employer in the economy - at the median. Now it is clear that this result may 












be a function also of the specific skills and occupations that SOEs require, yet it is 
evident initially at least, that SOEs seem to be remunerating their most skilled 
employees (predominantly Whites) better than any other employer in the labour 
market. 
What is provisionally evident from the above though, is that there is a premium for 
Africans and Coloureds to working in the public sector, and for Whites and Asians, in 
SOEs. We can extend this analysis, to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of this 
differential in earnings, by examining the entire distribution of earnings according to 
these employer types. Figure 7 below derives what is known as a cumulative 
distribution function (c.d.f.) of earnings. The two figures below derive a set of c.d.fs 
firstly for all employees in the sample, and secondly for African workers only - both 
by the different employer types. 
Figure 7 thus derives four different c.d.fs firstly for the aggregate employed, the 
public and private sectors and finally one for SOE employees. The figure provides 
the wage per month on the horizontal axis, and the cumulative share of individuals 
earning at or below this monthly amount on the vertical axis. For example, Figure 7 
shows that for individuals in SOEs or the public sector, about 75% are earning R5000 
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Figure 7: Cumulative Distribution of Total Wages in SOEs, Public and Private Sector 
The c.d.fs offer the advantage of examining relative earnings across the entire wage 
distribution. For example, then, while 75% of public sector and SOE employees earn 
R5000 or less, the share of private sector employees earning below this figure, is 
much higher at about 85%. Visually the functions impart a crucial message: they 
inform us that at every point in the wage distribution, the share of private sector 
workers earning below a specified wage, is higher than that for the public sector or 
SOEs. The latter two sectors are therefore uniformly better remunerators than the 











differentials and wage inequality. In this regard, the gradient of the curve tells us of 
the level of intra-group wage inequality. The flatter the curve, the more evenly 
distributed income is. Corroborating the evidence provided above, the c.d.fs show 
clearly that the wage differentials are lower in the private sector, relative to the other 
two employer types. 
It would be interesting though to examine the distribution of wages amongst African 
workers, and in this way control for at least one of the key confounders in the 
determinants of earnings in the labour market. As a result, Figure 8 below displays 
the distribution functions for the set of employer types amongst African workers only. 
The low earnings overall for African workers in the private sector, are again displayed 
below. In contrast, SOEs and the public sector, reveal in conformance with the 
median wage data, higher wages than the national and private sector distributions for 
African workers. 
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Figure 8: Cumulative Distribution of African Wages by Sector 
R10000 
What is interesting however, is that the disparity in distributions between SOE and 
public sector African employees is greater than when examining all workers. In other 
words, at every point in the distribution, African workers in the public sector are 
better off than those in SOEs. SOEs thus are poorer employers of African workers, in 
remuneration terms, than the public sector - but better than the private sector. 
The c.d.fs for White employees (Figure 9) is in contrast to the African worker 
distribution functions . Visually, it is evident that there remains very little difference 
in the earnings of White workers in SOEs as opposed to the private sector, at higher 
points in the distribution. Interestingly, in the top-half of the distribution, it is the 
public sector that is the worst remunerator of the three. Conversely, for White 
workers earning at or below the median for example, the private sector is the worst 
remunerator. The median wage figures in the table above, although not expressed in 
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Figure 9: Cumulative Distribution of White Wages by Sectors 
R200 0 
Hence, while the private sector is a poorer remunerator than the other two employer 
types at the bottom of the distribution, these differences disappear between SOEs and 
the private sector higher up in the wage distribution. This homogeneity in the White 
employee wage distributions at the high-end, provisionally suggests that higher wages 
paid to these workers within the SOEs, is more operative at the bottom rather than 
top-end of the distribution. 
Another interesting issue, and it is one alluded to in the final two graphs above, is the 
differences in wages when controlling for occupation across the three employer types. 
Table 3 below provides evidence on the median wages of employees by the 9 main 
occupational categories and the employer types. The last two colunms in the table are 
instructive in that they present the ratio (expressed as a percentage) of SOE median 
wages to the public sector and the private sector respectively. 
Table 3: Median Wages by Occupation between Employer Types 
: Occupation 
SOE: SOE: 
Public SOE Private Public Private 
Managers 8000 7000 5350 87.50 130.8 
rofessionals 5500 7800 6500 141.82 120.0 
Technicians 4100 4843 2800 118.12 173.0 
Clerks 3000 3500 2000 116.67 175.0 
Service 3000 2008 1100 66.93 182.5 
Agricu1ture 1400 800 433 57.14 184.8 
Crafts 2000 2400 1387 120.00 173.0 
Operators 1950 2500 1600 128.21 156.3 











In addition, the earnings in bold represent the highest earnings within an occupation 
comparing within the employer categories. We find that for all occupations, the 
highest medians are reported for the public sector or a SOE. What is perhaps more 
relevant here though, is the median occupational wage within a SOE relative to the 
public and the private sector. In the latter case, it is evident that for all occupations, 
SOE median wages are higher than those in the private sector. In particular, note that 
SOEs pay their unskilled workers 150% more than unskilled employees within the 
private sector. There is a significant premium accruing to an unskilled worker, should 
they be employed within one of the SOEs. In comparison with the public sector 
however, the results are mixed. In this case, SOEs in four of the occupations pay less 
than the public sector namely managers, service workers, clerks and elementary 
employees. The latter is particularly important as it suggests that despite the higher 
payment amongst SOEs relative to the private sector for unskilled workers, they are 
still paying workers at the bottom-end less than the public sector. The highest 
premiwn, this provisional evidence suggests, for elementary workers is to be found in 
the public sector. If one assumes that the private sector wage represents a proxy for 
an efficiency wage of sorts, then a case, albeit a tentative one at this stage, can be 
made that SOEs are in fact paying higher than an efficiency wage to all their 
occupations. If this is the case, then the factor cost reasoning for restructuring in the 
pursuit of higher efficiency levels, is a strong one. The problem with the above 
tabulation is that it essentially ignores a range of other variables that also affect wages 
paid by SOEs. These include race, gender, levels of education and so on. It is in 
trying to simultaneously account for all of these variables and their effect on 
individual earnings that we opt for a multivariate regression approach - something we 
tum to in detail in the next section. 
Prior to the earnings functions estimates though, we present one final take on wages 
within SOEs. We try here to examine the level of wage inequality by occupation and 
race within SOEs. Table 4 below provides this overview 15 • In the first instance, it is 
clear that, on the basis of median wages, the lowest earners (elementary workers) 
receive a median wage that is about 17% of the maximum median wage - earned by 
professionals. 
Table 4: Wage Differentials by Occupation in SOEs 
I %of Black as ' SOEs Black Coloured Indian White Total Professionals % of J 
(Total) White 
Managers 7000 N/O 5500 9000 7000 89.74 77.8 
Professionals 7800 4800 5000 9300 7800 100.00 83.9 
echnicians 3500 6000 4900 7000 4843 62.09 50 
Clerks 2500 3500 5200 4400 3500 44.87 56.8 
Service 1500 3500 5000 3900 2008 25.74 38.5 
Agriculture 800 1100 N/O N/O 800 10.26 N/O 
Crafts 1900 2500 N/O 6300 2400 30.77 30.2 
Operators 2300 6000 ~400 3800 2500 32.05 60.5 
E iementary 1400 950 N/O N/O 1300 16.67 N/O 
*N/O - No ObservatIOn 
15 For a more comprehensive table that includes not only SOEs, but also the private and public sector, 











This suggests a fairly wide dispersion in wages that could be a function of both skills 
disparities, and a shortage of highly skilled workers that results in a considerable 
premium for these workers. Noticeably, wages within the same occupational category 
differ by race group. For example, while an African manager earns R7000 per month 
at the median, the figure for a White manager is R9000. At first glance this is hard to 
explain given that we are constricting our sample to a fairly small number of pre-
defined enterprises. There would seem to be a number of possible reasons for this 
unusual outcome. Firstly, it is possible that the specific higher education degrees 
accumulated by Whites as opposed to Africans differs, and this results in different 
wages paid to ostensibly the same occupation. For example, should White managers 
predominantly have a post-graduate business qualification, while African managers 
do not possess this, then the differential is partly explained. Secondly, for historical 
reasons, White managers may have higher levels of experience in the specific job, and 
hence have moved higher up the wage hierarchy than African managers. Thirdly, 
there is the possibility that discrimination at the point of job entry, or within the job 
(in terms of promotion and so on) still exists within SOEs - so entrenching these 
differentials. The evidence garnered here is not sufficient to weight the importance of 
each of these factors, but it is clear that the three together would explain a very large 
part, ifnot all, of the intra-racial wage differential by occupational categories. 
4.2 Relative Wage Bill 
Taking a look at the relative wage bill l6 between production workers and non-
production workers would allow one to ascertain the relative importance of these 
workers in their respective sectors. Table 5 below gives us the proportion that non-
production and production wages contribute to the total wage bill in a firm. 
Table 5: Proportional Contribution to Total Wage Bill 
Public SOE Private Total Emp 
[Non-Production Workers 53.5 45.8 15.1 28.9 
IProduction Workers 46.5 54.2 84.9 71.1 
trotal 100 100 100 100 
We find that in both the public sector and SOEs, non-production and production 
workers contribute approximately equal amounts to the total wage bill. In the private 
sector however, we find a strong bias toward production workers: their wages form 
85% of the total wage bill. In the economy as a whole, production workers also form 
a large proportion of the total wage bill, though the contributions are not quite as large 
as that in the private sector (71 %). Two possible factors contribute to this. First the 
public sector and SOEs hire more non-production workers and second, they pay these 
workers more than in the private sector. 
16 The relative wage bill is calculated by multiplying the number of observations with the mean wage in 
each sector. Non-production workers consist of legislators, senior officials and managers, 
professionals, technicians and associate professionals. Production workers are clerks, service workers, 
skilled agricultural and fishery workers, craft and related trades workers, plant and machine operators 











A methodological way of testing whether or not the public sector and SOEs really do 












5. EARNINGS FUNCTION 
As mentioned above, a more satisfactory method of estimating whether a premium 
exists for workers in an SOE relative to the private sector17, is to try and 
simultaneously include all the relevant variables in our modelling of earnings in the 
labour market. We achieve this through the use of an earnings function regression. 
This earnings function formulates the relationship between the natural logarithm of 
monthly income and a set of employee characteristics, as well as indicator/dummy 
variables for working in the SOEs, public and private sectors. 
The specification ofthe regression is as follows. 18 
In (Earnings) = bo + b 1(Employer) + b2(Gender) +b3(Race) + b4(Exp) + b5(Exp2) + 
b6(Edu) + b7(Union) + b8(Occupation) + b9(Province) + b lO(Rural) 
where: 
• Employer is a dummy variable for the type of employer that an employee 
works in, i.e. SOE, public or private sector. 
• Gender is a dummy variable. 
• Race is a set of dummy variables constructed to reflect the four races in 
South Africa, i.e. Black, Coloured, Indian and White. 
• Exp is an experience variable constructed through the standard 
methodology of taking the employee's age less years of schooling less 
SiX 19• Exp is squared to form the quadratic equivalent EXp2. 
• Edu is included as a categorical education variable versus a continuous 
variable in order to isolate the effects of attaining a certain level of 
education. These categories are: (1) no schooling, (2) some primary, (3) 
completed primary, (4) some secondary, (5) completed secondary, (6) 
diploma and (7) degree. 
• Union is a dummy variable for union membership. 
• Occupation is a set of dummy variables for the different occupations 
defined broadly by Statistics South Africa, namely (1) managers, (2) 
professionals, (3) technicians, (4) clerks, (5) services (6) agriculture (7) 
crafts (8) operators and (9) elementary workers. 
11 Note that in an attempt to make results between the sectors more comparable, the private sector 
dununy does not include domestic workers or people in the agricultural sector. 
IR Note that initially both the person's industry and occupation were included in the regression. 
However, there were possible problems of multi-collinearity. Furthermore, the industry variable added 
little to the SOE regression as most of the coefficients were insignificant. 
[9 This method of constructing the experience variable has been criticized because individuals may not 
have "continuous work histories" after leaving school, particularly in South Africa where high levels of 











• Province is also a set of dummies for the nine provinces in South Africa. 
They are the Western, Eastern and Northern Cape, the Free State, 
KwaZulu- Natal, North-West Province, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and the 
Northern Province. 
• And Rural is a dummy for whether the individual lives in an area that is 
classified as rural or urban. 
The coefficients of the above-specified regression are presented in the first column 
(i.e. All) in Table 6 below. As alluded to above, note that all the relevant covariates 
are included in the regression, and in this way we are able to isolate the impact of any 
given variable on earnings levels in the sample. The figures in bold are significant at 
the 5% level, while the bracketed bold figures are significant at the 10% leveL We 
have run four regressions here. Firstly, we try and model the determinants of earnings 
for all workers in the economy. We then run three separate regressions to understand 
earnings formation in the three employer type categories SOEs, the public and 











Table 6: OLS Regression of In(monthly income) in different Sectors 
All Public SOE ··.·Private 
Type .. of Employer: (Omitted: Private Sector) i 
Public Sector I 0.231 
SOE 0.211 
Gender (Omitted: Male) 
Female -0.309 -0.232 I -0.272 -0.328 
Race:African (Omitted: African) '. . 





0.256 0.289 0.332 
Indian 0.356 0.169 0.608 0.395 
White I 0.671 I 0.422 0.503 0.757 
Experience 
Experience 0.038 0.024 
! 
0.030 0.042 
Experience2 -0.0005 -0.0002* -0.0003 -0.0006 
Edu~adon:(Omitted:lVoschooUng) , .: 
Some primary 0.153 (0.191) 0.164* 0.131 
Completed primary 0.296 0.370 0.078* 0.276 
Some secondary 0.447 0.612 0.227* 0.409 
Completed secondary 0.743 0.871 0.524 0.685 
Diploma 
I 
1.034 1.128 0.647 0.980 
Degree 1.281 I 1.266 1.001 1.331 
.. Union Membership .• ' ii • 
Trade union member i 0.405 0.409 0.237 0.409 
'. Occupation IOmitted: Elementary) . ..... ..>~+ .' . J 
Manager 0.820 0.780 1.143 0.776 
Professional 0.606 0.495 0.866 0.779 
Technician 0.488 0.436 0.660 0.472 
Clerk 0.331 0.243 0.509 0.356 
Services 0.096 0.261 (0.230) (0.051) 
Agriculture -0.529 -0.131 * -0.083* -0.586 
Crafts 0.186 0.228 0.272 0.184 
Operator 0.305 I 0.179 I 0.502 0.315 
..Province (Omitted: Gauteng) i.· .'. 
Western Cape -0.085 -0.089* -0.298 (-0.072) 
Eastern Cape -0.348 -0.156 0.060* -0.460 
Northern Cape -0.293 -0.232 -0.154* -0.299 
Free State -0.356 -0.171 -0.279 -0.418 
KZN -0.157 -0.183 -0.278 -0.135 
North-West -0.039 -0.054* -0.007* -0.041 
Mpumalanga 
I 
-0.133 -0.157 0.089* -0.130 
Northem Province I -0.335 -0.077* -0.326 I -0.502 
Location (Omitted: Urban) ....... ~ 
Rural I -0.163 . -0.179 I -0.287 1-0.152 . 
Constant h~~ .... ti~~t .. -1;·:;%----65~~2 .~-. ~.g:g .. -C""'-'-' .,'.' Number of observations " 
--'-'-'---'-'---'-'~'-" 
R-Squared I 0.5457 ! 0.4497 0.5721 0.5469 












OmittedJdropped categories are the private sector, African, male, no education, elementary worker, 
Gauteng and urban areas. Bold coefficients are significant at the 5% level, while those that are bold and 
in brackets are significant at the 10% level. An asterisk shows the variables that are insignificant in the 
equation 
The results for the first regression are fairly standard, and have been replicated in 
numerous studies on the South African labour market20 • Hence we find, for example, 
that being a female (and controlling for a matrix of other supply characteristics) 
reduces your earnings, relative to males by about 31 % in the labour market. In 
addition, Coloured, Asian and White workers all earn more than Africans - with the 
differential greatest for Whites as the latter earn about 67% more than Africans. 
Similarly, higher education levels induce greater returns, as does living in an urban (as 
opposed to rural) area and being a union member. But perhaps the most interesting 
result is that for the employer type dummy variable. Here, the dummy variable 
referent is the private sector. The results suggest that when controlling for gender, 
race, occupation, education and so on, if an individual is in a public sector, they will 
earn about 23% more than a worker in the private sector. This represents the wage 
premium for working in the public sector. The wage premium for working in a SOE 
is 21 %. In other words, it would appear on the basis of this evidence, that simply by 
being in a SOE, an individual is likely to earn a higher wage than an individual in the 
private sector, when controlling for a range of other covariates. The evidence 
therefore, of factor costs that may be present within a SOE (and public sector) 
which are not due to pure labour market or market forces - is particularly strong on 
the basis of these results. 
Having found that being employed by one of the three employer types does result in 
significantly different wages, the regression is run again without the sector dummy, 
but with a qualifier instead: we measure the determinants of earnings by the specific 
employer type. These results are also presented in Table 6. The SOE regression 
results show firstly that Asian workers actually earn more than White workers -
relative to the referent category. Furthermore there appears to be a lower return to 
earnings by race, when moving from the private to a SOE and then to the public 
sector. Simply put, being White (and controlling for a range of other characteristics) 
results in a greater return relative to being African, when in the private as opposed to a 
SOE. The gender dummy suggests that the gender wage differential is greatest in the 
private sector and lowest in the public sector. 
It would seem that workers with some primary education earn more than those with 
completed primary education within SOEs. However these coefficients are not 
significant enough for one to say so. For the education categories that are significant, 
we can see that having completed secondary education, a diploma or degree has lower 
returns in SOEs than in either of the other two employer types. Union members seem 
to have less bargaining power in SOEs as workers earn less there than those that work 
elsewhere. The SOE regression seems to be a weaker regression than the others with 
more insignificant variables, however this is largely due to the smaller sample size of 
5 15 weighted observations. It is worth noting that while trying to isolate effects of 
being a Black or White worker in SOEs, there were too few observations to allow 
significance in most ofthe variables. 











Ultimately then, the above regression results point to a number of key conclusions. 
Firstly, that being in an SOE in and of itself offers, a wage premium to a worker 
employed in that enterprise. A SOE employee will earn a premium of21% relative to 
a private sector employee. This is very strongly suggestive (as is the public sector 
result) of non-market based factor cost structure within SOEs - and points to a 
confinnation of one of the key reasons often provided for the need for SOE 
restructuring. Secondly, while there are race and gender differentials within SOEs 
(and as the first section outlined a lopsided representation), the evidence suggests that 
these differentials when controlling for a number of other covariates are lower than in 
the private sector, but higher than those found in the public sector. Finally, union 
membership appears to be least influential amongst SOE employees than in the 











6. LABOUR MARKET EVIDENCE OF SOE RESTRUCTURING: 
CASE STUDIES 
The previous sections have yielded significant insight into the SOE labour market and 
the environment within which it operates. The results show that in general there has 
been an over-representation of Whites and under-representation of Africans in SOEs 
as a whole. This trend is also apparent by gender, with composition skewed toward 
males in SOEs. Historical reasons, un/availability of education and supply of skilled 
labour seem to be the reason or partly the reason for over-representation of Whites 
and males in SOEs (since SOEs have a higher percentage of skilled workers than the 
other two sectors), as well as the wage differential between racial groups. Regression 
analysis shows that public sector employees followed by SOE employees have a wage 
premium. In other words, by simply being employed within these two sectors, one 
would be paid significantly more than if a person was employed in the private sector, 
though this premium seems to be more prevalent in all the races except for Whites 
who experience this premium only below their median wage. Our results pre-empt 
questions such as the extent to which restructuring has on the distribution of 
employment, wages, equity and gender equality in the SOEs questions unanswered 
due to lack of data. We attempt to answer these questions in this section by 
examining case studies of South African SOEs. 
We focus particularly on Eskom, the South African supplier of electricity, as it was 
the only SOE that possesses extended data on their employees. Some of the other 
SOEs also provided a limited amount of data but they were available only in a format 
that made manipUlation of data difficult. After this in depth examination of Eskom's 
data, we examine other case studies. Although the data is fairly fragmented the 
exercise is still useful in that one is able to identify clear trends. 
6.1 Case Study: Eskom 
Having looked at a snap shot of the SOE labour market, we now focus on a specific 
SOE, in particular Eskom and gain a deeper understanding of the effects that 
restructuring have had on Eskom as well as the potential effects that restructuring 
would have on other SOEs. 
The data was provided by Eskom and is by far the most comprehensive data set that is 
available. Though data was provided for 1994 to 2001, there were inconsistencies in 
the 1994 data set and therefore this paper focuses on the period 1995 to 2001. 
Another data set, which contains the details of all the terminations over the years, was 
also provided and is used extensively to find the characteristics of terminated Eskom 
employees. The variables provided included gender, race, age, household size, 
marital status, qualifications, designations, union membership, termination dates and 
income. Also, by data manipulation, basic characteristics of entry-level employees 
were discernible allowing us to make inferences about the nature of employment 
patterns within the electricity regulator. 
6.1.1 Employment Trends in Eskom 
Below (Figure 10) is the graphic representation of changing employment levels in 
Eskom since 1995. It clearly shows a decline in employment numbers in Eskom, 











Eskom lost approximately 8500 workers in total, which amounts to losses of 21.4% or 
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Figure 10: Employment Trends in Eskom 1995-2001 
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Figure 11: Racial .Breakdown of Eskom Employees 1995-2001 
Breaking down these employment figures into race, gender and skill we are able to 











Starting with Eskom's racial makeup, Figure 11 above reveals that over the years 
Eskom consists of mainly African and White workers. A move toward being more 
demographically representative may be seen with the predominant reduction of White 
(10.4% decrease over 6 years) and increase in Black (6.4% expansion over the same 
period) employment in Eskom's workforce. Increases in Asian and Coloured workers 
may also be observed. 
This employment equity shift is also visible in Figure 12, where employment is 
broken down into male and female workers. Figure 12 clearly illustrates a movement 
toward the employment of more female workers and over seven years, Eskom 
managed to increase its female employees by 4.4%, however it is still largely 
dominated by males. 
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Figure 12: Gender Breakdown of Eskom Employees 1995-2001 
In terms of skills, we find that the three main classes of skills that form the core of 
Eskom's personnel are semi-skilled/skilled, semi-professional and basic skilled 
respectively while the rest make up only about 10% ofEskom's workforce21 • We find 
that semi-skilled/skilled workers have contributed slightly less (1.7%) to overall 
employment over the years. Basic skilled workers have also diminished, but this time 
by a hefty 22.8%. Similarly but not with quite the magnitude, we find that the share 
of semi-professional workers have increased by 11.2% over the past six years. 
Managers and senior professional have also formed a larger portion of Eskom 
employment over the period 1995 to 2001 (1.4% and 2.1 % respectively). 
In an effort to make the data more manageable and digestible, three broad skill 
categories were created. They are basic skilled, skilled and highly skilled. These 
were constructed by grouping semi-skilled/skilled and training into "skilled" workers; 
leaving basic skilled as it is and combining the other five categories in to "highly 











skilled" workers. Henceforth we refer to these skills categories however graphs with 
full skill categories are available in Appendix D, Figure 44 & 45. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
• Basic o Skilled • H. Skilled 
Figure 13: Basic, Skilled and Highly Skilled Breakdown of Eskom Employees 
From the graph above, the decline in basic skilled workers is clear as well as the 
increase in the employment of highly skilled employees. This suggests a shift toward 
a more skilled workforce in Eskom. 
We postulated above that the dominance of males and Whites in SOEs were due to the 
fact that Whites and males had the skills that SOEs required due to the past Apartheid 
regime. Taking into consideration the fact that the skilled are paid more than 
unskilled we expect Whites and males to command a higher wage level. We would 
also expect a visible wage differential to be present between the various categorical 
groups. With questions such as these in mind, we proceed with an examination of 
wage levels and differentials in Eskom. 
6.1.2 Wage Levels and Differentials in Eskom 
The employment dynamics and trends of Eskom are not only useful in providing 
insight into how it operates as a firm, but also instrumental in allowing one to form a 
deeper understanding of Eskom's wage structure. We start with a look at wage levels 
and differentials in this section by analyzing median wages of employees categorised 
by race, gender and skill and then carry on to consider the cumulative distribution 
functions (c.d.fs) of these groups. 
Tabulated in Table 7 below are the median wages of employees broken down into the 
sub-categories. Before analysis is undertaken it should be noted that the "average 
median salary and package are averages of the median wage over the seven years. 
Note too that complete tables with yearly information are included in Appendix D, 











As expected, both salaries and packages increased progressively in Rand tenns over 
the years for all race, gender and skill groups. Supporting the findings of the previous 
sections we find that on average Asians (instead of Whites) are the highest paid 
workers in tenns of both salaries and the entire package although the differential 
between the two races are slight. Below in Table 7 we find that by comparing the 
average wage over the years, Asians are followed closely by Whites, with Coloureds 
and Africans coming in a weak third and fourth in tenns of earnings (fonning only 
59% and 49% of Asian earnings respectively. It is very interesting to find that while 
Africans earn about a fifth of the median White earner in the national sample, in 
Eskom, Africans earn more than 50% of White earners. It would seem that there is a 
premium for African workers to work for Eskom. Doing the same for gender, we get 
an unanticipated finding. Females in fact earn more than males; however only 
marginally. Males earn 90% of the salaries that females earn and 96% of the total 
packages females receive. 
Table 7: Average of Median Earnings & Percentage of Highest Earnings 1995-2001 












!Asian R87868 100% R120507 100% 
!African R42513 48% R58556 49% 
Coloured R51002 58% R71430 59% 
M'hite R80194 91% R114535 95% 
K;ender 
lFemale R62989 100~ R80734 100% 
Male R56584 90% R77463 96% 
Skill , ...... 
1- 18% !Basic skilled R34059 R46829 15% 
Semi-skilled/skilled R48664 25% R66454 22% 
raining R54983 28% R69712 23% 
semi-professional R85714 44% R115266 38% 
:management R148521 77% R245123 81% 
Professional RI04432 54% R170566 56% 
Snr professional R134899 70% R238877 79% 
Specialist R193911 100% R302768 100% 
Note that the "average" IS calculated by taking the average of the medIan wage or 
package during the period 1995 to 200 1. Also, the numbers represented in this table 
are nominal numbers. This however has no effect on the real numbers, as they would 
be deflated by the same inflation figures, i.e. we are essentially looking at ratios 
divided by the same denominator. 
As expected specialists command the highest salary and packages. In tenns of 
packages, management follows with 81 %, which is in turn followed by senior 
professionals. This pattern also emerges when one takes a look at net salaries, 











professionals and specialists are all round about RI00 000, showing that they all 
receive similar packages. These packages are also well endowed compared to the 
other skills categories. Workers involved with training obviously do not receive good 
remuneration packages and this is also expected, however they still earn more or 
marginally more than semi-skilled/skilled and basic skilled workers. 
The racial wage gap that is prominent in the whole of South African is apparent in 
Eskom as well. The racial wage gap is due to the fact that most of the African 
workers occupy the lesser skilled positions and are paid accordingly. 
So far we've looked at median wages, though it is useful in allowing one to take a 
brief snapshot of wages and compare them between groups, we are essentially looking 
at only one wage observation and not the entire distribution of wages. Using 
cumulative distribution functions (c.d.fs) as seen in the first section and graphing 
them, the entire distribution of wages is observable and inferences drawn on them are 
more reliable and accurate. 
Examining Figure 14 below we find that though on average median wages over the 
seven years show that Asians are the highest earners (and this is in line with earlier 
findings in the entire SOE labour market), in Eskom highest earners along the entire 
distribution are actually Whites, followed by Asians then Coloureds then Africans. 
Another interesting pattern is observable and that is the distribution of White and 
Asian employees are fairly close together as is that of Africans and Coloureds, i.e. 
there seems to be a wage gap between the two groups. Remembering that the gradient 
of the graphs shows the level of intra-group wage inequality, we find that the White 
and Asian employees have a more evenly distributed income while Africans and 
Coloureds do not. Using the same analysis for gender22, we find that until just 
slightly above the median, females earn more than males, however beyond that point 
males earn more. Note that on the x-axis, the median is situated at 0.5 and that is why 
in earlier analysis it was found that females earned more than males however this is 
untrue for the other 45% of females who actually earn less than males. In terms of 
wage equality in the male and females groups, males seem to command a more evenly 
distributed income. The entire c.d.f for males and females shifts to the right retaining 
their original shape and pattern year after year. This is as expected as nominal wages 
increases as prices increase over time. We find the same for the cumulative 
distribution of race. 
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Figure 14: Cumulative Distribution of Salaries by Race - Eskom 1995 
The c.d.fs of the different skill groups are also examined23 , however in order to make 
the graphs easier to read and more comprehensive, the different skill categories were 
again grouped to form three skill groups, basic, skilled and highly skilled. It is worth 
noting that the income of higher skilled employees is more evenly distributed than 
employees with less skill. Otherwise the graphs show us nothing out of the ordinary 
with higher skilled personnel obviously earning much more than those with less skills. 
This same trend occurs over the years but with higher salaries is due to the same 
inflationary effects. 
What is interesting from looking at wage differentials and c.d.fs of Eskom employees 
is that the wage and employment ratio between highly skilled and unskilled 
employees has not remained constant over the years. This usually means that there 
this either a movement along Eskom's labour demand curve or an exogenous shock 
has occurred causing a shift in the entire labour demand curve. This idea is explored 
in detail in a later section as it could answer the question of whether the changes in 
employment were due to restructuring or rather normal market processes. 
6.1.3 Terminations due to Restructuring, Employment Equity and Business 
Processes 
So far, we've been able to see how Eskom's workforce have changed over the years, 
however in terms of finding the impact that restructuring may have on employment, 
one would need to analyse the terminations of Eskom in detail for this information to 
become truly illuminating. 
Figure 15 is a graphical representative of total termination numbers in Eskom. From 
this graph, there is a visible and steady increase in terminations from 1995 (2425 











workers) to 1998 (3384 workers); there is then a sharp increase when almost 5000 
workers were tenninated in 1999. After 1999 though, the tenninations have slowed 
down to their previous levels of around 2500 every year. It would appear that the 
most intensive period of reorganisation within Eskom took place in the 1995 to 1999 
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Figure 15: Employment losses in Eskom 1995-2001 
What is interesting but not immediately apparent from Figure 10 and Figure 15 is that 
though total tenninations were 20828 strong, the Eskom workforce only decreased by 
8482 over the seven years. This means that although tenninations were experienced, 
job creation was taking place at the same time. 12346 positions were created or filled 
somewhere along the line. Unfortunately there is a misalignment problem in the data 
that disallows any real analysis in tenns of the tennination reasons24 . However 
simply looking at the tennination reason variable on its own without any inter-
variable comparisons and analysis, there is evidence that the reasons within which a 
person may be classified a "tennination" include transfers and promotions. This 
means that while 20828 workers left their current posts, they may have been 
transferred to different posts or new posts and/or new jobs have been created. Of 
course natural attrition is also a deciding factor. 
This is an important observation since it would be easy to attribute all tenninations to 
restructuring whilst forgetting that those tenninations portray simply the tennination 
of an existing contract of post and may have very little impact on the worker (i.e. the 
worker may have been transferred or dismisses for legitimate reasons such as 
misconduct). In other words, in this database, one should take care not to 
immediately assume that all tenninations are the result of restructuring. Keeping this 
in mind we probe further into the tennination profile and how it has changed over 
time. 











Looking at general employment trends in earlier sections, we've seen a general 
upward movement of African employment and a downward movement of White 
employment. There seems to be a switch "out of' White employment into African 
employment. This suggests that employment equity is in play, i.e. an internal labour 
market transformation is evident in Eskom. A question that arises from this is how 







Figure 16: Total Terminations categorised by Race 1995-2001 
African 
41% 
The pie chart above gives a nice representation of the termination profile of Eskom 
over the period 1995 to 2001. We find that total terminations were mostly Whites 
(52%) and Africans (41 %), together forming 93% of terminations. It is interesting 
that the categories impacted the most are composed mainly of White employees and 
this is a contributing factor to the decline in White employment in Eskom. This is a 
favourable result as the earlier fears that the reorganisation in Eskom would 
exacerbate the already unusually high representation of White employees is dismissed 
as there is a clear movement towards a more equitable distribution of employment. 
These net figures are important but what is worth noting is that the termination profile 
has changed over the years. In the beginning terminations were largely White (71 % 
of all terminations were White and 24% were African), but over time; African (60.6% 
of all terminations were African and 28% were White) workers were the main 
targets.25 
It is important to keep in mind that these are percentages of total terminations and that 
these terminations numbers vary over the years. This means that one should consider 
the total employment and racial impact of terminations when looking at these 
percentage numbers. Considering this, we find that although terminations in 1995 
were 71 % White, these terminations form 10% of total White employees in Eskom. 
On the other hand, while Asians formed only 1.4% of total terminations, these 
terminations formed 7.1 % of total Asians. Thus from Figure 17 below we find that 
though White terminations had decreased to 43.9% of total terminations in 1999, at 











that point they fonned a substantial 18.7% of Whites. What is also striking is that fact 
that though Asians fonned a small part of tenninations, those tenninations fonn 
approximately 7 or 8 percent each year. After 1999, a decrease in the tenninations of 
Whites as well as an increase in the tennination of African workers is apparent. 
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Figure 17: Termination by Race as a Percentage of Total Race - Eskom 1995-2001 
Moving onto an even more detailed analysis of gender, race and skill, the two graphs 
below show Eskom's employment trends broken down by gender and skill levels for 
Africans and Whites. In the first graph depicting African employment: African 
females and males are broken down into three general skill levels, namely basic 
skilled (1), skilled (2) and highly skilled (3). The graph below that in tum may be 
interpreted in the same way and is only different in that it applies to White employees. 
Anything above or below the zero line represents actual numbers of employment and 
actual tennination numbers respectively. 
Three key employment trends are inunediately apparent from the graph. Firstly the 
actual number of females affected by reorganization is significantly less than males, 
however this is due to the existence of relatively fewer females being employed in 
Eskom, particularly in the basic skilled jobs. We find that though this is true of both 
African and White females, White female skilled workers have lost employment over 
the years. In tenns of changes in gender profile, we find that the majority (in fact 
85%) of total tenninations over the period 1995 to 2001 were male with female 
tenninations fonning the other 15 %. 
Second, there is a "substitution" of highly skilled White workers by African highly 
skilled workers. This movement is clear in the two graphs below (A) and is indicative 
of labour transfonnations toward a more equitable workforce in Eskom. 
Third, despite the fact that these White employment losses extend to the skilled 











workforce (B). There seems to be a general shift toward skilled labour in Eskom and 
Africans are affected greatly as they formed the bulk of basic skilled labour to start 
with. Considering the wage premia existing in the public sector, this could possibly 
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Figure 20 and Figure 21 provides a more general look at skill for Africans and 
Whites, i.e. incorporating male and female employees give a clearer indication of the 
movement toward employment equity schemes and employment of skilled labour. 
Notably there were a large number of terminations throughout the seven years for 
basic skilled African personnel while this is not present for Whites, but this is because 
there were little or no White employees in that category initially (B). What is striking 
is that in net tenns there has been no employment of Whites in any of the skills 
categories; they have only seen a loss in employment. Though tenninations have 
diminished since 1996 for skilled workers, for highly skilled workers terminations 
have only diminished after 1999. In contrast African highly skilled workers have seen 
an increase in employment over the entire period. One may certainly say that a 
substitution ofrace within highly skilled workers was in effect (A). 
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In total the majority of terminations occurred within the highly skilled work group. In 
1995, 49.2%% of all terminations fell under this category though this number has 
fallen over the years, it remains high at 42.6% in 2001. The other 50% of 
terminations are made up of skilled and basic skilled personnel with skilled 
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Figure 22: Skill Breakdown of Eskom Terminations 1995-2001 
It is worth noting that the categories impacted the most are composed mainly of White 
employees and this is a contributing factor to the decline in White employment in 
Eskom. This is a favourable result as the earlier fears that reorganising would 
exacerbate the already unusually high representation of White employees are 
dismissed as there is a clear movement towards a more equitable distribution of 
employment. 
Examining the decomposition of terminations is enlightening, however it is very 
important to consider the impact the termination has on a particular skill group, i.e. 
terminations as a proportion of each skill category. In Figure 23 below, it is clear that 
highly skilled workers were cut by approximately 9 - 13%, while skilled workers did 
not lose a large percentage of their colleagues. Basic skilled workers lost a large 
20.1 % of total basic skilled workers in 1999 and this is a clear indication of some 
form of reorganisation occurring in Eskom. 
The crucial points that are present in the data are that there is a movement toward 
skilled and highly skilled employment resulting in the employment loss of many basic 
workers. Due to the predominance of African workers in the basic skilled, we find a 
large number of African terminations. Besides the movement towards skilled labour, 
there is also a movement toward more equitable labour, found by the substitution of 











separate movements and in doing so understand that terminations were not only 
African basic workers but also skilled and highly skilled Whites. 
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Figure 23: Terminations by Skill as a Percentage of Various Skills Categories 
Taking a closer look at the original skill categories (find the relevant graph in 
Appendix D, Figure 44), the skill categories that decreased in size the most were 
professionals, senior professionals, management and specialists. Basic skilled 
workers were cut by 20.1 % in 1999, forming the largest decrease in all skill categories 
over the six years. This along with its next two cuts of 13.5% and 12.7% respectively 
largely resulted in the heavy reductions in basic skilled workers - from 25.7% to 
12.9% of the workforce. The skill breakdown of total tenninations from 1995 to 2001 
is depicted in the pie chart below and clearly indicates that highly skilled workers 
bears the brunt of tenninations (46%) followed by skilled workers (34%) and basic 
skilled workers (20%). 











It is however crucial at this point to remind the reader that this depicts only 
terminations and is not the profile of Eskom's total employment, since many people 
are employed during the same period that terminations have occurred. 
Having established the skill categories that are hardest hit by terminations; we now 
look at the racial breakdown of those skill categories in the table below. 
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From Table 8 and Figure 16 above, we see that Eskom terminations were 52% White 
and 41 % African, but Table 8 not only gives a racial breakdown but relates the 
terminations to skills as well. Note that the numbers in bold show the biggest 
contributor to terminations in terms of race. Comparing Africans and Whites only, we 
find that in terms of lower skilled positions, i.e. basic skilled and semi-skilled/skilled 
work, Africans terminations already formed 33% of total terminations. Among the 
same categories but with Whites we find that these lesser skilled personnel only 
formed 16% of total terminations. In fact most White terminations were the more 
skilled workers and they were the ones who contributes disproportionally to the 52% 
White termination rate. 
Given the above it is useful to see the reasons for termination. The reasons for 
termination is categorized into those that have (1) absconded i.e. when someone 
leaves suddenly, (2) deceased, (3) resigned, (4) retired, (5) retrenched and (6) 
dismissed. The terminations that can definitely not be attributed to the restructuring 
of SOEs would be those that have absconded, deceased retrenched or dismissed. Note 
that "dismissal" is characterised by law into three types, misconduct, incapacity or 
operational requirements. Dismissals that are attributed to the employee's 
characteristics or actions are usually distinguished from dismissals that are purely on 
an operational level. Thus, retrenchments are dismissals due to operational 
requirement. Terminations categorised as 'resignation' would also not be affected by 
restructuring since a person faced with restructuring would be certain to accept a 
retrenchment package rather than forfeit any benefits and resign anyway. These four 

















Figure 25: Terminations broken down by Reason 
Resignation 
31% 
The effect of restructuring is thus encompassed within the "retirement" and 
"retrenchment" category. It is common practice to offer early retirement and 
voluntary retrenchment packages during the process of restructuring, thus the task 
now is to distinguish between persons who have retired at the retirement age and 
those who have retired early. Retirement age in Eskom is 65 years for both male and 
female. From this we find that 36% are early retirees26 and together with legitimate 
retirees (4%) make up the total 40% of the "retirement" category. Keep in mind that 
these retirements, be they conventional or not are voluntary and employees are 
compensated. This means that only involuntary terminations fall under 
"retrenchment" which is earlier defined as dismissals due to the misalignment of 
operational requirements, i.e. they were due to changes in normal business processes. 
As mentioned earlier, there are misalignment problems in the data that disallows one 
from breaking down the termination reasons further27. Adopting a prudent 
estimation/measure we assume that none of the voluntary retrenchments were due to 
conventional reasons such as financial stability or illness etc, and none of these 
terminations were transfers or career moves that results the employee in staying in the 
firm. As mentioned earlier "retrenchments" are dismissals due to operational 
requirements. This is usually considered a business process, however one may never 
be sure that this is so in this case. Once again to be prudent, all "retrenchments" are 
considered part of the restructuring process. 
Thus this implies that restructuring could result/affect a maximum of 51% (10500) of 
terminated employees and a lower bound of 36% (7 411) in Eskom over the period 
1995 to 2000. 
26 Note that these early retirees include not only those offered retrenchment packages and early 
retirement packages but also persons who retired out of their own choice due to circumstances such as 
illness or simply because they can afford to retire. 











6.1.4 Unions and Hick's Bargaining Model 
A discussion that involves compensation to terminated employees should include 
unions and the role they play in the labour market. Represented below in Figure 26 is 
Hicks' (1966) bargaining modeL It is a graphical representation of the behaviour of 
unions and employers in a bargaining situation. The percentage of wage increases or 
the wage rate is shown on the vertical axis and the expected length of strike is on the 
horizontal axis. Note that the y-axis does not necessarily have to be wages; it could 
be anything that the two parties are bargaining for e.g. compensation, severance 
packages etc. For ease, we continue to call it wages. 
Employer behaviour is mapped by the "employer's concession curve" and union 
behaviour by the "union resistance curve. The premise is that unions start off with 
relatively high demands (W1) and as time progresses would lower these demands if 
negotiations drag on since this would result in loss of income to their members 
(Ehrenberg & Smith, 2000). Conversely the employer begins by offering small wage 
(W2) increases and slowly raising their offers as the expected strike period rises 
causing profits to falf8. This bargaining process continues until the two curves meet, 
resulting in a wage increase of Wo and an expected strike period of So. 
Applying this model to the relationship dynamics between unions and the benevolent 
state instead, one would expect the "employer's concession curve" to shift up. Simply 
put this means government would offer more wages or compensation for all expected 
strike levels since a benevolent state acts in the interests of its citizens. It is also 
commonly known that the governing party (the African National Congress or ANC), 
the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) are part of a tripartite alliance. This means that COSATU's 
"union resistance curve" would also shift upward, since the alliance results in more 
leverage power when bargaining. 
Slightly more than 50% of the terminated workers belonged to a union. Of those that 
were unionised, 52% belonged to the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and 
National Union of Metal workers of South Africa (NUMSA), both of which are 
COSATU affiliates. Even though Eskom's workforce is not totally unionised by 
COS A TU or its affiliates, there are enough members to command bargaining power. 
Thus COSA TU is able to bring higher wages or compensation to not only their 
members but to all employees affected. In other words, just by simply being a 
dominant union in Eskom, COSA TU would shift up the total union resistance curves. 
-----~~----
2& Note that depending on situations presented, the shape of the two curves may differ but they would 
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Portraying this logic on a Hick's (1966) bargaining model graph, the initial 
equilibrium wage a union and employer would agree on is Wo, given by the 
intersection of the two smooth curves. In the case of South Africa, we find that for 
the same expected strike length, the state and unions would agree on a wage W* 
(intersection of the two knobbed graphs) which is higher than normally required. 
The behaviour of these two parties gives rise to two observations. First, workers are 
likely to earn higher wages in an SOE environment. This has been verified on 
numerous occasions in this study pertaining to SOEs in general as well as Eskom as a 
case study. Second, that in the case of a dispute or in this case restructuring, the 
compensation or severance packages are better endowed in SOEs. Workers seem to 
be better off being employed by SOEs as well as being terminated by SOEs. In other 
words, the results from restructuring by a benevolent state are more equitable and 
socially desirable than restructuring by a profit driven firm. 
The above two sections on employment wages and terminations have shown that 
during the years 1995 to 200 I, Eskom has reduced its work force by slightly more 
than 21 %, with a steady stream of terminations over the years barring 1999 where a 
sudden surge of terminations may be observed. However though Eskom lost 8482 
over the years, total terminations over the same period amounted to 20828 workers. 
This means that there had to be job creation at the same time. With data 
manipulation, the basic characteristics of both terminated and newly appointed 
employees were ascertained and Eskoms employment trends thus became observable. 
We find that Eskom's workforce composed mainly of Whites and Africans. Also 
with each progressive year the total terminations moved from mainly Whites to 
mainly Africans. Although this is the case, the White terminations each year formed a 
large proportion of total Whites employed in Eskom and this is the driving force 
behind a reduction from a White composite of 43.6% in 1995 to 33.2% in 2001. 











Indian. In the previous sections we suggested that there may be a movement toward a 
more representative workforce in all the SOEs. We find this same trend in Eskom, 
though the percentage of Whites! Africans is still too high to be representative, it is 
clear that there has been a concerted and conscious effort toward employment equity 
transformation. This is also apparent when employment and terminations by gender 
are analysed. Eskom started with 86.4% males and 13.6% females in 1995, and 
though Eskom is still composed predominantly of Males in 2001, there is a signi ficant 
increase of females (to 18%). 85% of the terminations over the seven years have been 
male with only 15% female which seems to suggest that Eskom is hoping for a 
demographically representative workforce in the long run. 
Looking at the general breakdown of skills in Eskom, it is observed that terminations 
occurred in higher skilled categories, categories that are mainly composed of White 
personnel. A clear movement from White highly skilled and skilled workers to 
African highly skilled and skilled workers may be observed. This suggests that this 
reorganisation is rather an employment equity impetus rather than pure government 
restructuring. However, at the same time, a large number of basic skilled positions 
were also terminated. These terminations were largely if not in all totality African but 
one should remember that the composition of this skill category was predominantly 
African to start with. 
A more detailed look in the various skills classifications reveals that the majority 
(approximately 90% through out the seven years) of the workforce comprised mainly 
three skill groups (1) semi-skilled/skilled, (2) semi-professional and (3) basic skilled 
workers. Semi-skilled/skilled workers remained fairly constant while semi-
professionals grew and replaced basic skilled workers in terms of the percentage they 
contributed total Eskom employees. Not surprisingly 80% of total terminations were 
also formed by these three skill categories, which suggests a surplus of less skilled 
personnel. However due to the fact that there were so many less skilled workers, even 
an 80% termination rate resulted in a proportional reduction of less than 10% (i.e. 
those terminations only formed 10% of the less skilled workers). Contrast this with 
almost 20% termination of all professionals in the year 1999 and we find that the 
skills that are losing the most proportionally are higher skilled workers. It is also 
interesting that the terminations in these higher skilled categories are the ones that 
push White terminations past African terminations (which were largely less skilled 
workers) in absolute terms even though higher skilled groups formed only about 10% 
of Eskom' s employees. 
Looking at terminations broken down by termination reason, we find that 49% of total 
terminations were definitely not due to restructuring. The other 51 % of total 
terminations were possibly due to restmcturing (this number does include persons 
who have legitimate early retirement reasons as well as persons who may have been 
terminated for purely market process reasons). These terminations involved 
employees receiving early retirement or voluntary retrenchment packages. 
Investigating this further and using Hick's bargaining model, it is found that the South 
Africa's political economy supports an environment in which both the union and 
benevolent state are more inclined to demand and offer better wages or compensation. 
This leads us to suggest that the results of restructuring by government are more 











combined with the presence of a wage premium puts SOE workers in a better position 
in both employment and termination scenarios. 
Previously, this paper showed that restructuring was not a significant contributor to 
total terminations. But perhaps the most important finding in this section is that there 
is great difficulty in separating restructuring and business process changes for both 
encompasses each other. 
Having looked extensively at Eskom, we now turn to other SOE's in South Africa. It 
should be noted that the data provided by the various SOE's were incomplete and 
difficult to compare except on the most basic levels - the reason why this section has 
a bigger focus on qualitative data (i:e. based on interviews) rather than quantitative 
data. 
6.2 Case Studies: Other SOEs in South Africa 
This section tackles the difficult task of analysing and comparing other SOEs 
(Telkom, and Denel in particular). The task is difficult in that the data collected from 
these enterprises are firstly incomplete and second very difficult to compare. Telkom, 
Denel, PortnetlNational Port Authority (NPA)29 and Metrorail were able to submit 
helpful data. In addition to the data, interviews were conducted allowing one to have 
a more rounded view of how things operate in SOEs and the different impacts that 
restructuring programs have had on these firms. As mentioned earlier, data from the 
Telkom and Denel were not aligned exactly. For example occupation is categorised 
differently between the two firms making inter-firm comparisons difficult and one 
should exercise caution in comparing the firms directly for the obvious reason that the 
nature of their businesses are quite different. It is unfortunate that Transnet as a 
whole was not able to submit data even though some of its constituencies (Portnet, 
NPA and Metrorail) did, as this causes fragmentation in the data. To avoid confusion, 
this section will house predominantly Telkom and Denel graphs. Other relevant 
graphs are included in Appendix E. 
As previously mentioned, Telkom is involved in the telecommunications industry, 
Transnet is in the transport industry and Denel the defence industry. Taking a genera] 
look at their employment over time (unfortunately there are different time frames in 
the data available), we do find similar trends in employment. In Figure 27 and Figure 
28, both firms are seen to have experienced a sharp decline in the number of workers 
hired. Telkom for example gained 4,600 workers moving from 1997 to 1999 but then 
proceeded to lose almost 21,700 workers over the next three years (36%). During the 
same period, i.e. from 1997 to 2001, Denellost almost 4000 workers as well, however 
in 2002 Denel increased their employment by 1000 workers. Spoomet's workforce 
also decreased by about 2,800 workers during the period of one year (from December 
2000 to December 2001) and Portnet (before the unbundling into NPA and SAPO) 
1,360 from 1999 to 20003°. Metrorail lost in total slightly more than 800 employees 
from 1999 to 2002. It should be worth noting that these absolute terminations form a 
very small percentage (ranging from 7% to 10%) of their workforce as well as the fact 
29 Portnet is a sub-division of Trans net. It unbundled in 200 I to form the National Port Authority 
(NPA) and SA Port Operations (SAPO). Thus 1999 and 2000 dara pertaills to Portnet in its entirety 
while the 2001 and 2002 data concerns only the NP A. 











that these terminations do include natural attrition such as death and normal 
retirement. 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Figure 27: Total Employment - Telkom 
Disregarding absolute numbers for a moment for Telkom and Denel, we see that the 
proportion that terminations form part of total employment is slightly higher in 
Telkom. What is important to note though is the difference in reasons for these 
terminations. While Denel faced a global reduction in demand for defence items 
(Interviewee, Denel, 2002) and responded accordingly by cutting costs, Telkom on 
the other hand experienced a technological change in their industry which required 
less labour intensive work. 
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Over the past few years, the Telkom31 has experienced, automation, modernisation 
and digitalisation (99.6% of the network was digitalised) of their telecommunications 
networks resulting in less demand for labour intensive work. The use of optic fibre 
cables is a prime example of how technology has changed the labour requirements of 
the industry. In the past, copper wires were used, and they required thirty people with 
specialised trucks to dig the trenches and layout the lengths of wire. With optic fibre 
cables, an instrument may be used to shoot the cable into the ground wherefore it 
comes out at a calculated area further down. This process requires only two persons 
who are sometimes outsourced (for example electricity cable layers may also lay these 
wires and they are outsourced to do so if they are working in a suitable area. In 
addition to less labourers required for the actual laying down of cables, less workers 
are needed to look after the line exchanges. In the past, approximately 30 people 
would look after the 10,000 lines that copper wires provided. With optic fibre cables, 
100,000 line exchanges became available and requiring only 5 people to monitor 
instead of 300. These technological changes are the predominant reasons for the 
reduction in Telkom's workforce in 1999 and 2000. New and changed processes also 
contributed to increased terminations. Services such as the activation of phones, 
repairs and phone billings were all re-engineered to become more efficient. 
The movement away from labour intensive work is clear from Figure 29 below. 
There is a clear reduction of the number of basic skilled workers32, particularly during 
the year 2000. Although the absolute number of skilled workers has remained fairly 
stagnant, the proportion that they form of Telkom's workforce has grown 
tremendously over the years. The proportion of highly skilled workers has also 
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Figure 29: Skill Breakdown ofTelkom Employees 
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31 An interview with a Telkom technician of eighteen years who later moved into human resources for 
another nine years proved to be highly informative and comments in this paper are based on his 
knowledge. 
32 Basic skilled workers consist of support workers and training engineers. Skilled workers are those 
that are categorized as supervisory workers and operational workers . Highly skilled workers are 











There are however also growth areas in Telkom. Consumer service grew by 3 to 
4,000 employees. This included an international call centre, service centres etc. With 
the opening of the market, Telkom did not have monopoly power any longer, 
requiring new strategies to retain and gain new customers. As a result their marketing 
division grew. Losing monopoly power also meant that new products and services 
were required to be able to compete with other firms. This resulted in another growth 
area, i.e. the Information Technology (IT) sector involving developing new software 
and technologies. New business plans included setting targets that were linked to an 
incentive scheme for employees encouraging efficiency. However perhaps it should 
be mentioned that unfortunately the IT and Marketing form a very small part of 
Telkom's workforce. Technical/engineering employments on the other hand forms 
the core ofTelkom's business and have increased proportionally over the years. 
Though the functional breakdown of skills in Denel differs from those ofTelkom, one 
is still able to see the large decline in less skilled workers, i.e. the "labour/operators". 
Administrators, financiers, technologists, draughtsmen and computer specialists have 
all decreased substantially over the years. In fact the only group that has grown in 
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Figure 30: Functional Breakdown of Denel 
The reasons for the general loss of employment in Denel are twofold. First, the fact 
that Denel is no longer subsidised by government meant that they had to scale down, 
face business realities and become more profitable by being more efficient. Second, 
the demand for war and weapons depend highly on exports: usually long term 
contracts, planes, and maintenance etc, which has declined in recent years. For 
example Datam operations, which involve the servicing of Boeings had to be shut 
down due to bad business and small guns have also seen a reduction in their demand. 
The combination of these two factors has resulted in the contraction of Denel's 











In terms of race, though Denel's workforce is by no means proportionally 
representative of national race figures, it has moved great bounds toward being a more 
equitable employer. From Figure 31, there is a clear downward trend in the 
employment of Whites, and a slow but increasing number of non-White members of 
their workforce. Interviews revealed that although provisions such as moulding 
young African students with potential in school by providing bursaries etc. were made 
to change the racial composition, the technical skill base is still lacking amongst non-
Whites. The young candidates are performing well however they require time in 
order to be qualified enough. Unfortunately the Denel data set did not have functional 
occupations broken down by race, otherwise one would be able to see that while 
engineers are 90% White and 10% non-White, the trainees are 30% White and 70% 
non-White (Interviewee, Denel, 2002). Spoornet has seen relatively stable race 
components in 2001 and 2002 except for White employees who have decreased by 10 
% while Portnet has seen a decrease of 1 % for Whites, Coloured and Asian workers 
from 1999 to 2000 with Africans staying constant. 
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Telkom has had a fairly consistent 50/50 constituent of White and non-White 
employees over the years (Figure 32). Non-Whites did form a larger part pre-1999, 
however with the decline in the need for labour intensive work, non-Whites have also 
seen a fall in the share of employment since skilled work was less accessible to them 
during Apartheid. This is presented by (A) in Figure 33. By comparing the net 
employment of White and African employees by skill one is also able to identify the 
movement away from White toward more equitable employment (B) in Figure 34. 
Note that though net employment for both Africans and Whites are largely negative 
(except skilled workers in 1998), White terminations are greater than African 
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Unfortunately Metrorail's database included gender but not race. In terms of gender, 
females form a very small part of SOEs in general. In Portnet females formed only 
9.5% of total employees in 1999 and increased by only 1 % in 2000. Similarly 
Spoomet increased by 3% to 10% in 2002 in a year whilst Metrorail grew 5% 
progressively over a four-year period to 13% in 2002. Both Denel and Telkom 
possess a much greater share of female personnel compared with Transnet 
constituencies. Telkom had 21 % females in 1997 and this number has grown to 27% 
in 2002. Denel had 23%, which increased to 27% in 1999 but few back to 24% in 
2002. Regardless of the numbers, it is clear that SOEs are making a concerted effort 
to become more demographically representative, both in terms of gender and race. 
Focusing on terminations in Figure 35 and Figure 36, we find that company initiated 
terminations in Telkom was particularly great in 1999 (approximately 11 ,000 
workers). In the next two years, this number abated to an average of about 3600 each 
year. Breaking these figures down further into termination types: outsourcing, 
resignation and retirement shows a once off outsourcing that formed almost 2,000 of 
losses in employment in 1999. Forced resignation and retirement was highest in 
1999, then slowing down in the following two years. In total company initiated losses 
amounted to about 18,300 jobs. Voluntary severance packages were offered as well 
as early retirement packages. The National Ports Authority (NP A) also offered 
voluntary separation packages to their workers. Over three years, there were about 78 
separation packages, most of them White males (60), followed by White females (11). 
Due to insufficient data, more in depth analysis of the NP A is not possible and thus 
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During the interview with the Telkom representative as well as represented in Figure 
37, it is clear that support staff were the most adversely effected followed by 
operational staff. The interview also revealed that security companies, cleaning and 
catering staff were the ones to be outsourced. Tendering finns for the provision of 
Telkom's catering, cleaning and security services were favoured if they could show 
that ex-Telkom employees would be employed or given a trial period. Telkom also 
developed a social plan that taught workers how to tender for an outsourcing job as 
well as provide the relevant training. A Black empowennent program was also set up 
and it involved providing start-up capital of RI0600 to ex-Telkom workers who 
wanted to begin their own businesses. 
Looking at Denel, it is interesting to see that the number of contract workers (contract 
work is essentially the same as outsourcing) have increased over the years while 
pennanent staff have decreased (Figure 28). There seems to be a substitution away 
pennanent staff toward more flexible contracting staff. If one were to exclude them 
from the real workforce of Denel, we find that the contraction of employment is 
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Figure 38: Contract Workers in Denel 
Having looked at the available data from the Telkom, Denel and some of the 
constituents of Transnet, we find the same basic trends as those in Eskom. All SOEs 
have seen large terminations over the past few years and restructuring is a major 
player in contributing toward those terminations. However interviews have revealed 
that technological change (in Telkom) and changes in demand for the SOE products 
(Denel) have also added to the need for either a less labour intensive workforce or a 
slimmer, more efficient workforce; both market driven movements. Even though the 
data for Transnet members was fragmented due to the unbundling of Portnet and the 
time period too short for in depth analysis of employment loss, there is a clear 
movement toward a demographically representative workforce. Telkom and Denel 
also showed these trends and though none of the SOEs are close to the real 
representation of national race compositions, there is a clear movement toward it. 
Hence not only are SOEs responding to market forces, they are also trying to become 
more equitable at the same time. Restructuring was still inevitable since firms strived 
to not only survive but to make a profit since the opening of markets and the resulting 
competition requires this of them. Non-core operations were outsourced or contracted 
out which means that even though employees are removed from the organisation's 
pay roll and classified as terminated, they still have a job. 
This highlights an important point. It is easy to make the assumption when 
terminations are caused - either due to restructuring or business process changes - that 
the story ends with the worker being without ajob. However looking at the flow chart 
below (Figure 39) we find that given such changes in a firm, an employee is faced 
with two scenarios, either job loss or no job loss. At this point it is easy to make the 
wrong assumption that this is the end of the story. On the contrary, after job loss, an 











First, the employee may be outsourced, i.e. the employee continues to work but on a 
contractual basis. Second, the employee may re-enter into the market but to another 
sector, i.e. worker mobility such as an Eskom engineer going to work as an engineer 
in the mining industry. Third, the worker may re-enter back into the same sector due 
to dynamic effects, e.g. the ex-Telkom worker going to work for Vodacom. 
-1 NoJobLoss ] 
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Figure 39: Employee Job Scenarios 
However lastly, the employee may be faced with no employment. When this occurs, 
there should be a social net for these persons in terms of a social plan and skills 
development. It is with this in mind that we briefly explore the choices that a worker 












7. SOCIAL PLAN 
Policy makers have had an ongoing struggle with the tough task of finding the most 
effective labour market policies that would create sustainable reduction in the 
unemployment in South Africa. There are two types of labour market policies, one 
that involves active national expenditure and another that uses passive national 
expenditure. Passive expenditure is classified into expenditure on income 
maintenance such as unemployment compensation and early retirement, while active 
expenditure involves employment services that include training, direct job creation in 
the public and private sector and support for unemployed who are interesting in 
starting up their own business (Schomann, 1995). Active spending requires the 
cooperation and contribution of all parties involved. It is also more effective in terms 
of empowering the unemployed to become self-sustainable without returning to the 
ranks of the unemployed, thus not just alleviating poverty but also creating growth in 
work and skills. In fact the report by Schomann (1995, p.25) have gone so far as to 
suggest that the balance of active and passive expenditure should be shifted more in 
favour of truly active measure. 
The Employment and Skills Development Services (ESDS) Programme resulted in 
the implementation of the Skills Development Act, 1998 and the Skills Development 
Levies Act, 1999 (Dept. of Labour, 2001). The aim of these two Acts is to improve 
the working skills of South Africans and create a better standard of living by creating 
an active labour market policy. The Skills Development Act created new structures 
for training, created new funding incentives to encourage more training, proposed 
ways of assisting employment and created new forms of learning programmes (Dept. 
of Labour, 2001, p.25). 
A particular area of interest is the development of Sector Education and Training 
Authorities (SETAs). The idea is that employers, workers and government 
departments who are working in a particular sector should converge and register with 
a SETA and together make changes. SET As thus become the key promoters of 
training by creating a sector skills plan, which identifies the strengths, weaknesses, 
and opportunities in the sector, sees where learnerships are required, acts as a 
regulator of standards as well as to disburse money from the National Skills 
Development Levy. 
In a sense, the Skills Development Levies Act pays for all of the above. Employers 
who pay more than R250 000 or more in monthly wages and salaries or who pay 
income tax pay a levy of 1 % of the payroll. 80% of this levy is then divided between 
the SET As according to the amount they contributed and the other 20% is put into the 
National Skills Fund. 
The SET As then use up to 10% of this money for administrative purposes and running 
cost. The rest are used to pay levy grants and discretionary grants to employers and 
are generally used to encourage the training of their staff. Levy grants are given to 
employers that pay the levy. When that employer meets certain criteria, the SETA 
will pay back a certain percentage of the levy back in the form of a grant. 
Discretionary grants on the other hand are not linked to the amount of levy that the 
employer has paid. They are given rather to meet priorities that the SET A may have 











The 20% of the Skills Development Levies that is placed into the National Skills 
Fund, along with donor money and government contributions (straight from taxes) is 
used for new skills areas and development projects, focusing on training unemployed 
people. 
In terms of the restructuring of SOEs and the impact this has on employees, there 
have been and will still be retrenchments. As contributors of the Skills Development 
Levy, SOE employers are able to claim levy grants, the first of which comprises 15% 
of the levy paid. A second grant is also available to them should they reach the 
targets sets in their workplace skills plans (50% of levy, which drops to 45% in 
200212). SOEs should use the claim to set up a social plan that suits their needs. This 
could include training employees and equipping them with skills that may be 
transferred to either other sectors or elsewhere in their existing sectors. The social 
plan that Telkom followed is a good example of how training cushions the impact of 
job loss for their employees. Telkom provided support and training as well as start up 
capital to those employees who needed or wanted it. The issue remains though of 
what happens to the retrenched employee after separation has occurred between the 
employer and employer since SET As generally do not provide for persons who are 
not employees of the particular sector. One thus turns to the National Skills Fund as 
they deal predominantly with the training of unemployed persons in the hope that they 
would become self-sufficient (e.g. set up their own businesses) or become more 
employable. A possible solution to ensuring that ex-SOE workers benefit from the 
National Skills Fund would be to allocate a certain percentage of the Fund toward 
workers previously employed in SOEs. This would then ensure that these workers are 
able to make a complete and successful transition into the private sector as well as 
other industries. 
It is however frequently argued that there is no acceptable basis for privileging certain 
workers or recently unemployed workers over and above millions of already 
unemployed workers (Dept. of Labour, 1996). This argument strengthens when 
applied to SOE workers for three reasons, SOE workers: (1) receive a wage premia of 
approximately 23% over workers in the public sector33 due to the presence of a 
benevolent state and the tripartite alliance between it and COSATU (the most 
prominent union in South Africa), (2) have had relatively higher job security simply 
due to the way SOEs have operated over the years and the fact that SOEs did not need 
to consider much the matters of inefficiencies (3) would have received a severance 
package in the process and (4) that severance package would be larger than a similar 
package in the private sector, once again due to the Hick's bargaining model and how 
the state interacts with the unions. The counter argument is to prevent the erosion of 
skills by lengthy periods of unemployment (Dept. of Labour), i.e. to maintain the 
existing skills base. The idea is that the returns to re-training someone with existing 
skills is likely to be higher than one who has little or no skills whatsoever as the 
likelihood of the unskilled to fall back into unemployment is great. One should not 
forget though that there might be other unemployed persons with skills. Should 
preference be given to ex-SOE employees with the same skills as that person, 
particularly when that person could have been jobless for a year and have received 
none of the benefits that SOE workers have? Erosion of a non-SOE person's skills 











would have reached a further point than those who have just been retrenched. Perhaps 
a preferential waiting list of a year would be appropriate allowing ex-SOE workers a 
chance to be resourceful with what they have learned when they were still employed 
and part of the SET A levy grants. This would certainly be viable particularly if the 
first step of applying for grants occurs while employees are still employed by SOEs. 
One should also consider the claim that workers who are threatened by restructuring 
are those that are older and less mobile with a shorter working life remaining (Dept. 
of Labour, 1996, p.IOO) versus social returns to investment in younger, relatively 
more mobile albeit currently unemployed with little skills. 
90% of the National Skills Fund has already been allocated, mostly for survivalist 
purposes. A "Queue Management" system will be put in place and preference given 
would depend on social accords. Taking this into consideration, it would be unlikely 
that an ex-SOE employee would qualifY for a position in the front ofthe queue. 
Given this, it would seem that the onus would fall on the SOE to provide a social plan 
to the ex-employees by setting up their own fund, however instead of having to 
finance this entirely on their own, it would make more sense for the social plan to take 
place before the actual retrenchment occurs since the SETA's would be able to 












The LFS data reveals that SOE employment constitutes only 3% (or 340000 workers) 
of total employment in the society. Considering that there are 11.7 million individuals 
employed in either the formal or the informal sector and approximately 6.6 million 
workers that are jobless, the possible impact that restructuring of SOEs may have on 
unemployment in small and is statistically not likely to engender significant effects on 
national unemployment levels. 
There is evidence that shows that workers in the public sector and SOEs command a 
wage premium by simply working in these sectors, particularly those that are 
unskil1ed. Assuming that private sector wages may be used as a proxy for an 
efficiency wage, it may be said that SOEs are paying a higher than efficiency wage to 
their employees. This means that the factor cost reasoning for restructuring in the 
pursuit of higher efficiency levels, is a strong one. 
Focusing on Eskom as a prime example of and SOE, we find that although 
terminations were 20828 strong, the workforce decreased by only 8482 over the 
period 1995 to 200 I, a sign of reorganisation in the firm, i.e. both hiring and firing 
occurred. 
We find that a combination of forces drives this reorganisation, namely employment 
equity, restructuring as well as normal business processes. Employment equity is 
represented by the high rate of terminations amongst White employees and the 
substitution of these numbers by African employees, particularly amid highly skilled 
and skilled jobs. A maximum of 51 % or terminations and minimum of 36% (Le. 
between about 10 500 and 7 400 individuals) may be attributed to restructuring simply 
by looking at terminations broken down by reasons. 
Applying Hick's industrial dispute model to the specific relationship dynamics 
between unions and the benevolent state, (keeping in mind the tripartite alliance 
between the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions), we find that the benevolent state would 
offer either better wages or severance packages than employees in the private sector. 
The mere presence of COSA TV as a majority union in Eskom means that they are 
able to secure higher wages of not just their members but for all workers in Eskom. 
The combination of a benevolent state and good trade union relations means that those 
retrenched are at an advantage compared to the same situation in the private sector. 
Though SOEs relative impacts on aggregate unemployment levels are small, this does 
not minimise the importance of welfare consequences to SOE restructuring. What is 
clear is that there is great difficulty in separating restructuring and business process 
changes since they both encompass one another. Given these changes in a firm, an 
employee is faced with two scenarios, either job loss or no job loss. After job loss, 
there are another four scenarios: outsourcing, re-employment into the same sector, re-
employment across sectors and finally job loss. The social netting for those who 
become unemployed would require SOEs to claim against the Skills Development 
Levy (that they contribute to) in order to make workers better skilled, more 











SOE employee would find it hard to qualify for a position in the front of the National 
Skills Funds queue which allocates preference depending on social needs. In other 
words it would make more sense for the social plan to take place before the actual 
retrenchment occurs since the Sector Education and Training Authorities (SET As) 
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A.I Information on the 4 Major SOEs 
The table below gives a brief look at the to 21 public sector firms. Note that the 
numbers for Transnet may be slightly misleading since the Financial Mail includes 
Transnet and its subsidiaries as separate firms (DPE, 2000). 
Table 9: Top State-Owned Enterprises in South Africa 
Firm 'T.ot31·. assets Turnover Net income J[~~l~yees . , .' (Rm) , .. (Rm) .. (Rm) 
Denel (1997) 4253 3013 82 I 14200 
Telkom 27 107 20 160 2427 57496 
Eskom 69975 21 071 2750 37311 
Transnet 42779 21 680 2 165 100592 
Total 
.... 
14~n4 65924 7424 f!c~Q9 599 ..... 
IDC ..... 17049 3567 765 502 
DBSA .. I 12002 925 423 465 
Land Ballk··· . 5775 2377 371 98 
Impofin 3297 220 9 
Rand Water 3212 1 900 258 4000 
Findevco 2770 485 21 -
Konoil 2337 82 180 
Post Office 1 793 2469 -272 29195 
Airport Co. 1 695 710 228 1 718 
SABC 1 617 2474 105 3217 
Foskor 
. 
1 323 1 297 135 2 163 
Safeol : 808 569 9 5362 
. Atlantis 683 907 i 80 2275 
Sapekoe .. 201 119 0 11 000 
Alexkor . 200 175 -23 1 078 
Abakor. 115 290 -55 2200 
Aventura 111 146 -8 1 610 
Total 1741Q~ 
'c •...... 
84636 9650 !< j7A.,.A.~,··· • .>,.,,'.::' 
From the table, the four most important SOEs are Denel, Telkom, Eskom and 
Transnet. Together they comprise approximately 83% of estimated total assets, 
provide 78% of turnover, 77% of net income and employ 76% of all employees in the 
top 21 SOEs. Thus these four companies will have the greatest impact in meeting the 
government objectives on restructuring (DPE, 2000). In terms of employment effects, 
other than the four large SOEs, the Post Office and Sapekoe will affect a larger 
number of employees. Otherwise, the restructuring of SOEs is unlikely to have a 
major impact on overall employment trends (DPE, 2000). 
What follows is a brief section on the four different SOEs to allow the reader more 











A.2 Denel Overview34 
Denel (Pty) Ltd was established on I April 1992 as a private company with the State 
as the sole shareholder. It is a major player in South Africa's defence sector, making 
up 50% of the industry's turnover (DPE, 2002) and dominating the four major areas 
of the domestic defence market, namely aerospace, ammunition, weapon systems and 
military vehicles. 
The Denel Group consists of a holding group and four divisions namely Denel 
Aerospace, Denel Ordnance, Denel Commercial and Other businesses, each 
containing subsidiary companies. Aerospace is made up of Denel Aviation Military 
Aircraft, Denel Aviation Airmotive, Astro Park, Datam, DPS, Eloptro, Kentron and 
OTB. The Ordnance Group consists of LIW, La Forge, Mechem, Naschem, PMP, 
Somchem, Swartklip Products and Vector. On the commercial side, Irenco (Pty) 
Limited, Dendustri, SPP, Bonaero Park (Pty) Limited, Denel Properties (Pty) Limited 
and Aero Properties (Pty) Limited are the subsidiary companies. Finally Densecure 
(Pty) Limited is the captive insurance company ofthe Denel Group. 
The decline in South African defence spending has made Denel reliant on the 
international market; however there has also been a recent decline in that market too. 
The government suggests breaking Denel up and selling off less than 100% of shares 
in each cluster (e.g. aerospace, heavy ordnance etc.) or divisions as separate entities 
(DPE, 2000); focussing on clusters or divisions that are easy to privatise or attractive 
to investors. Also processes of finding suitable strategic equity partners for Denel 
Ordnance and Denel Aerospace is being undertaken, as well as investigations into the 
consolidation of the South African aerospace industry (DPE, 2002). 
A.3 Telkom Overview35 
In 1991, the Department of Posts and Telecommunications was separated into the 
South Afkan Post Office and Telkom. Telkom is an oligopoly (currently a duopoly) 
with 70% owned by the South African Government. The other 30% was sold to US-
based SBC communications Inc and Telekom Malaysia Berhad (together comprising 
the consortium Thintana Communications) in May 1997. 
T elkom is the incumbent fixed line operator in South Africa and held the exclusive 
licence to provide public switched telecommunication services until May 2002.The 
group has been transformed and restructured to effectively compete in a more 
liberalised market. Telkom's 50% shareholding in the Vodacom Group makes it 
Africa's leading provider of mobile services. (DPE, 2003). 
Vodacom also has a 31.5% equity shareholder - Vodafone pic. Ucingo Investments, 
which is a broad-based investment company also has a 3% shareholding in Telkom 
SA Limited (DPE, 2002). 
34 Denel (2002): www.deneLco.za 











A.4 Eskom Overview36 
Eskom is South Africa's dominant electricity utility and is ranked in the top five in the 
world in terms of capacity and sales (DPE, 2002). It is reputed to be one of the lowest-
cost producers of electricity in the world and also sells electricity to neighbouring 
countries such as Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe (DPE, 2002). 
In addition, Eskom has a number of subsidiary companies. Eskom enterprises (Pty) 
Ltd was formed as a holding company to develop the non-regulated activities of 
Eskom, i.e. Eskom Enterprises (Pty) Ltd is a subsidiary company or Eskom and in 
turn consists of various subsidiary companies. 
The subsidiaries are Airborne Laser Solutions, Amazing Amanzi Systems, Arvia.kom, 
Bonesa Electricity (Pty) Ltd, EE_Kom, Eon Solutions, Electricity Africa, Pebble Bed 
Modular Reactor, PTM, Rotek Industries, Sapphire Executive air, Technology 
Services International, and Trans Africa Projects (Eskom Enterprises, 2003). 
The restructuring of Eskom should be looked in terms of generation, transmission and 
distribution activities. At the moment, there is a generation oligopoly, a transmission 
monopoly and distribution is fragmented (DPE, 2000). The first step involves 
corporatising Eskom with all three activities becoming separate corporate entities 
(DPE, 2000). The introduction of competition in to the generation market was agreed 
as necessary in achieving greater market efficiencies (DPE, 2000). Transmission is a 
natural monopoly and will likely remain state owned and in terms of distribution, a 
number of regional electricity distributors will be created (DPE, 2000). The 
Department of Public Enterprises is still currently evaluating the different models for 
restructuring Eskom (DPE, 2000). 
A.S Transnet Overview37 
The government department South African Transport Services was transformed into a 
public company (of which the South African Government is the sole shareholder) in 
1989, and became Transnet Limited on 1 April 1990. Transnet is a holding company 
and consists of nine divisions that are involved in transportation or related services 
with over 100 000 employees (DPE, 2000). They are Spoornet, Port Authority, Port 
Operations, freightdynamics, Petronet, Metrorail, Propnet, Transtel, Transwerk 
Promat, as well as the South African Airways. 
As South Africa's largest transport operator, Transnet dominates the transport sector 
and contributes 3.2% to the South African GDP. Spoomet is the largest division of 
Transnet, but facing increasing competition, the general freight business has had a 
large negative cash flow. Portnet and Petronet are on the other hand, both highly 
profitable and they cross-subsidise the other divisions of Transnet (DPE, 2000). 
The restructuring of Transnet is hindered by the pension fund debt that is owed to the 
South African Transport Services (SATS) pensioners (DPE, 2000). Government 
36 Eskom (2002): www.eskom.co.za and Eskom Enterprises (2003): www.eskomentcrprises.co.za 











believes that it has the resolution to the debt problem; for example it received RIA 
billion from the sale of 20% of SAA to Swissair. The restructuring of Spoomet 
focuses on maximising the value of current shareholders but requires transformations 
prior to restructuring such as the corporatisation of various divisions (DPE, 2000). A 












B.1 The Data 
B.1.1 Data Set 
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a bi-annual rotating panel household survey 
designed specifically for the purpose of analysing employment and unemployment in 
South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 200 I). Conducting a rotating panel sample 
involves visiting the same dwellings on a number of different occasions and replacing 
a proportion of these dwelling units each time (20% in this case); allowing one to 
track the change of individual members as well as change in the overall employment 
situation (Stats SA, 2001). The data set used in this analysis is the LFS September 
2000, six months after the pilot round of February 2000, and of which 40% of the 
households were revisited. The September 2000 survey provides detailed information 
on 65 499 adults of working age i.e. between the ages of 15 and 65. 
Using probability weightings which involves taking the inverse of the probability of 
selection, it is then possible to weight up the 65 499 adults to a 26.9 million 
population that is demographically representative of the South African population38• 
The official/strict definition of the unemployed incorporates those within the 
economically active population who: (a) did not work seven days prior to the 
interview (b) want to work and are available to start work within a week of the 
interview and (c) have taken active steps to look for work or to start some form of 
self-employment in the four weeks prior to the interview (Stats SA, 200 I). The 
expanded definition excludes criterion ( c). 
The expanded definition of unemployment is used in this report even though most 
countries use the official/strict definition of unemployment. The strict definition is 
appropriate only when labour markets are efficient, whereas the expanded definition 
is appropriate when people no longer search for jobs because the believe that non are 
available (Moll as cited in Nattrass, 2000). In South Africa, a country where transport 
costs are high, low incomes and low probability of finding a job, it is expected that a 
high level of discouraged work seekers exists (Nattrass, 2000). In order to take these 
discouraged job seekers into consideration, this paper uses the expanded definition of 
unemployment in its analysis. 
B.1.2 Methodology and Variables Created39 
The LFS September 2000 data set contains much information, including information 
on people who are not of working age. The first and perhaps most important step is to 
make sure the data set included only those between the age of 15 and 65. Thus all 
information on unsuitable persons is disregarded. 
38 For a more detailed look at the weighting methodology, look at the LFS September 2000 Metadata. 











The weighting system is based on probability weightings and it is important that this 
be taken into account. This is done by using 'svy' commands4o or by rounding the 
weights to the nearest one and treating them as frequency weights. 
The LFS does not have a variable that captures the actual monthly income of all the 
persons in the data set. It is problematic as it has actual incomes but varies from 
weekly to monthly to annually. Multiplying weekly incomes by 13/341 and dividing 
annual incomes by 12 creates a new monthly income variable. 
Another new variable was created using the LFS' education variable. This is done by 
grouping the original variable in to persons with no schooling, primary schooling, 
high school education without matriculating, matriculants, technical colleges, 
technikons and university degrees/ postgraduate diplomas. This allows one to make 
better inferences with respect to education obtained particularly when running 
regressions. For example, matriculants are coded as 13 while NTCI obtainers are 
coded as 14, however this does not necessarily mean that NTCI obtainers have more 
years of education. Running a regression on this could easily become hazardous. 
Dummy variables were created for SOE's, private and public sectors. This is based on 
the "business type" question and allows for between sector comparisons. 
40 For more information on Stata7 and 'svy' commands, refer to StataTs reference and user guides. 
41 It is multipiied by 52112, which is the same as 13/3. For example, someone who is getting paid R I 00 
a week is not getting paid the same as someone who is getting paid R400 a month, R J 00*52 R5200 












C.I Labour Force Survey 
Table 10: Complete Table of Median Wages for all Sectors and Occupational Categories 
%of Black as 
Public African Coloured Indian White Total Managers %of 
(Total) White 
lManagers 8000 6565 5900 8000 8000 100 100 
:professionals 5000 6000 5900 6000 5500 68.8 83.3 
frechnicians 4000 5000 4000 5167 4100 51.3 77.4 
Clerks 2600 2500 2000 4058 3000 37.5 64.1 
Service 2500 3700 4800 5000 3000 37.5 50 
!Agriculture 1300 1160 2900 3600 1400 17.5 36.1 
Crafts 1800 3056 6400 5400 2000 25 33.3 
Operators 1700 2631 7000 4500 1950 24.4 37.8 
!Elementary 1500 2000 2000 2800 1551 19.4 53.6 
%of Black as 
SOEs African Coloured Indian White Total Managers %of 
(Total) White 
[rv1:anagers 7000 N/O 5500 9000 7000 100 77.8 
Professionals 7800 4800 5000 9300 7800 111 83.9 
Technicians 3500 6000 4900 7000 4843 69.2 50 
Clerks 2500 3500 5200 4400 3500 50 56.8 
Service 1500 3500 5000 3900 2008 28.7 38.5 
~griculture 800 1100 N/O N/O 800 11.4 N/O 
Crafts 1900 2500 N/O 6300 2400 34.3 30.2 
g rerators 2300 6000 4400 3800 2500 35.7 60.5 
lementary 1400 950 N/O N/O 1300 18.6 N/O 
%of Black as 
Private African Coloured Indian White Total Managers %of 
(Total) White 
~anagers 3000 5000 5000 8000 6500 100 37.5 
rofessionals 3500 5500 5617 8333 7000 107.7 42 
ffechnicians 1700 2800 3033 5400 3333 51.3 31.5 
Clerks 1500 2400 2500 3000 2300 35.4 50 
Service 1000 1450 1500 2184 1200 18.5 45.8 
~gricu1ture 400 650 1010 3250 433 6.7 12.3 
Crafts 1200 1625 3000 4800 1400 21.5 25 
Operators 1400 1668 1950 3146 1500 23.1 44.5 
IElementary 500 650 1517 1700 520 8 29.4 
I Total %of Black as 
Employed 
African Coloured Indian White Total Managers %of 
(Total) White -.. --
~~nagers 3467 6200 5000 8000 6000 100 43.3 
Professionals 5000 6000 5617 7000 6000 100 71.4 
Technicians 3000 3700 3300 5500 3667 61.1 54.5 
Clerks 1900 2413 3500 
I 
3500 2500 41.7 54.3 
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Figure 41: Termination Profile - Race 
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Tablel1: Median Salaries and Packages by Race 
Salary 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Ave. 
[Asian 59505 69720 79710 88800 97440 105015 114885 87868 
IAfrican 27120 30840 36150 41430 49580 53400 59070 42513 
~oloured 31860 37020 43065 49680 56520 64650 74220 51002 
iWhite 62670 39090 77190 84630 91200 99150 107430 80194 
!package 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Ave. 
iAsian 74209 88456 103122 124029 136742 148915 168075 120507 
African 37986 43539 51458 59447 60231 74414 82814 58556 
~oloured 46859 54226 62459 72089 79063 88116 97200 71430 
:MUte 85742 94354 104165 117963 121641 133770 144110 114535 
Table 12: Median Salaries and Packages by Gender 
Salary 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Ave. 
Female 44550 49200 55050 62550 68700 76380 84495 62989 
Male 38190 42870 48660 53670 64200 70440 78060 56584 
Package 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Ave. 
Female 56380 62938 70820 82139 87281 97948 107632 80734 
Male 53422 60108 68263 77586 81192 95615 106052 77463 
Table 13: Median Salaries and Packages by Skill 
Salary 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2()01 Ave. 
Basic skilled 24870 27180 31590 34590 37110 40020 43050 34059 
Semi-skilled/skilled 38130 41160 45000 48210 51780 56100 60270 48664 
Training 29160 31428 34554 47580 64950 76980 100230 54983 
semi-professional 67950 72990 79680 85260 90600 97800 105720 85714 
management 113850 124920 136470 147480 159270 172110 185550148521 
Professional 82410 88980 96930 104415 110820 118770 128700 104432 
Snr professional 102945 112410 124290 135585 144090 156975 168000134899 
SQecialist 144375 159870 180375 195120 211710 225750 240180 193911 
Package 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Ave. 
Basic skilled 33230 37089 43674 48891 46571 57067 61279 46829 
Semi-skilled/skilled 51826 56407 61451 67821 66681 77633 83360 66454 
Training 37212 40508 49681 65820 79491 95571 119702 69712 
semi -professional 92562 99389 107323 117765 119024 130710 140086115266 
management 186126 204912 224155 249756 262227 283963 304725245123 
Professional 132816 143938 156879 173695 179718 195896 211021170566 
Sm professional 169102 186518 206913 230173 239806 261288 378338238877 
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D.2 Misalignment problem in Eskom data. 
Two variables in the Eskom data called tennination reason and tennination type has a 
misalignment problem. Tennination type categorises the tenninations into six broad 
categories, resignation, retirement, retrenchment, absconded, dismissed and deceased. 
This variable is used in the analysis as per nonnal. The other variable called 
tennination reason breaks down the categories even further, for example, transfer, 
promotion, dismissed, nonnal retirement, early retirement etc. Under nonnal 
circumstances this would be ideal data, which has the potential to reveal the exact 
people who are effected by restructuring, business processes or employment equity 
plans etc, however the misalignment problem occurs when one tries to cross tabulate 
the two variables. A simple way of illustrating this would be to show the reader an 
example. 
In the table below is the tennination type "deceased" broken down into tennination 
reason. The problem may be seen immediately. One would expect that the reason a 
person is categorised as deceased is death. It is rather surprising to find that the 
reasons range from career path interest to marriage. Though the majority (94%) of 
terminations attributed to death is categorised correctly, it would be irresponsible to 
use the data regardless of the problems it encompasses. 
Table 14: Termination Type - Deceased 
Termination reason Freq. Percent Cum. 
Transfer ER same grade 3 0.14 0.14 
Transfer EKR same grade 2 0.09 0.23 
Transfer 10 0.46 0.69 
Employee asked to resign 1 0.05 0.74 
Dismissed w/appeal 1 0.05 0.78 
Contract cancelled 1 0.05 0.83 
Organisation structure 2 0.09 0.92 
Formal training opportunity 1 0.05 0.97 
Career path interest 6 0.28 1.24 
Challenge 11 0.51 1.75 
Contrary to agreement 2 0.09 1.84 
Personal relations 6 0.28 2.12 
w/coUeagues 4 0.18 2.3 
w /supervisor/manager 1 0.05 2.35 
Locality/Area 5 0.23 2.58 
Normal retirement 1 0.05 2.62 
Early retirement (63) 4 0.18 2.81 
Early retire (w/poten. serv) 3 0.14 2.95 
Retrenchment (redundancy) 8 0.37 3.31 
Death 2048 94.29 97.61 
Pregnancy 1 0.05 97.65 
Marriage 3 0.14 97.79 
Transfer of husband 3 0.14 97 .93 
Personal circumstances 20 0.92 98.85 
Reasons outstanding 25 1.15 100 











Even though there is a misalignment problem, one may still make use of the data, 
though to a lesser extent. For example it gives tells us that when a person is 
categorised as "terminated" this does not necessarily mean that they leave the firm. A 
person who is transferred to another post is considered terminated at the previous 
post. One should therefore be very careful when looking at termination numbers and 












E.1 Miscellaneous graphs for "Other" SOE's 
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Figure 47: Total Employment Trends in Spoornet 
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Figure 49: Total Employment in Metrorail - 1999-2002 
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Figure 50: Employment Trends in terms of Race - Metrorail 
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